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It is a pleasure to introduce Katherine Stearns’ study of micro- 
enterprise promotion in the informal sector of developing countries.
It is a timely study. That the role of the informal sector will grow 
rather than diminish during the foreseeable future is increasingly 
apparent. Although agriculture will continue to dominate most developing 
economies3 the scope for new jobs in farming is limited; and the failure 
of the formal sector to accommodate burgeoning urban populations is all 
too evident. Alternative sources of employment must be identified and 
assisted.
Ms. Stearns examined the experiences of over 20 microenterprise 
promotion programs from around the world. Four criteria were used to 
evaluate their impact: the degree of employment created; the extent to
which incomes were improved; the level of financial self-sufficiency 
attained by the program; and the number of people who benefited from it.
She concludes that the most effective program design is one which 
targets very poor entrepreneurs, emphasizes credit rather than business 
education, relies on client self-selection and not program staff for 
assessing credit-worthiness, and initially extends very small loans with 
the proviso that larger sums will be forthcoming if repayment is prompt. 
This type of program lends itself to institutionalization and helps 
empower the poor through community-level organizing.
Another approach which can have a very favorable impact is the systems 
approach. Programs of this type provide credit, but also attempt to 
establish constructive links between informal and formal-sector firms.
Their strength lies in that, if institutionalized, they may be able to 
open up greater opportunities for informal microenterprises. However, 
they cannot directly reach as many entrepreneurs as programs which confine 
themselves to credit.
The more traditional microenterprise programs, which stress the impor­
tance of business education as well as credit, are shown to be the least 
effective. They tend to be costly, reach few entrepreneurs, and do not 
appear to raise incomes any more than programs stressing credit alone.
Ms. Stearns’ study was supported by the Rural Poverty and Resources 
Program of the Ford Foundation and we wish to acknowledge in particular 
the helpful guidance of Ms. Katharine McKee of the Foundation’s staff.
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I - INTRODUCTION
From 1970 to 2000 the labor force in developing countries is 
expected to double from one to two billion people. The agricultural 
sector will be able to supply jobs for only about 8 percent of these 
people (57. p, 244), The rest will have to earn their livings through 
nonfarm activities in rural areas or find some type of employment in the 
growing cities of the developing world. In both rural and urban areas, 
much of the economic activity will continue to take place in the informal 
sector, which supplies jobs, incomes, products, and services to an 
enormous segment of the population.
A strict definition of the informal sector is elusive. In general, 
the term refers to the portion of the economy composed of people oper­
ating or working in very small businesses who: lack formal government 
recognition, registrations, and support for their enterprises; have no 
access to commercial sources of credit; earn low incomes; and have no 
employment security. The terms informal sector and microenterprise should 
not be confused. Microenterprises operate within both the formal and 
informal sectors. Conditions in the informal sector are difficult and it 
is not the sector itself that deserves promoting. Indeed, one does not 
provide assistance directly to a sector, but to the people within the 
sector.
This analysis focuses on microenterprise development (as opposed 
to other employment- and income-generating strategies such as skills 
training, job placement, etc.) and identifies the types of microenter­
prise programs that can best contribute to immediate and long-term 
improvements in the conditions of the informal sector. Over twenty 
programs from all regions of the world are examined with regard to their 
various components, implementation strategies, and impacts in order to 
determine which are more effective and why. The emphasis is on the 
varying designs of the programs and not on other factors that influence 
program outcomes, such as the local culture, economy, politics, etc. 
Information on the programs comes from numerous evaluations, published 
studies, articles , and personal communications .-1/
The paper begins by familiarizing the reader with some aspects of 
the informal sector: the characteristics of its enterprises, the reasons 
for their emergence, their extremely important role in developing
lyCase studies on microenterprise promotion are neither numerous 
nor systematic. Moreover, there Is considerable dissent among development 
organizations about what constitutes a successful project and what 
evaluation criteria and methodologies are appropriate. A major challenge 
of this analysis was to draw useful and valid conclusions from diverse 
and occasionally conflicting studies.
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2economies, and the factors that constrain further employment- and 
income-generation by the enterprises. The ways in which microenterprise 
programs can help remove some of these constraints are suggested and then 
a number of the case studies are presented and examined. An analysis of 
four particularly successful programs leads to the identification of 
critical similarities in the designs of the four programs. Likewise, an 
analysis of several other programs reveals program components that tend 
to diminish the beneficial impact of the programs on informal enter­
prises. A comparison of the program designs and outcomes indicates three 
approaches to microenterprise promotion, the traditional, nontraditional, 
and systems, and shows how the nontraditional and systems approaches have 
the most potential for assisting informal firms.
II - THE INFORMAL SECTOR
Understanding the importance of microenterprises to the poor 
requires an understanding of the informal sector, where the poor earn and 
spend much of their money.
Its Characteristics. Causes, and Importance
The informal sector, though perhaps unrecognized as such, is 
apparent to both residents and visitors in the urban areas of developing 
countries. Residents, without the aid of signs or advertisements, usually 
know to which house or workshop to go when needing particular goods or 
services. Many of their demands are met by microenterprises that an 
outsider would be unlikely to locate. Visitors, on the other hand, often 
are introduced to informal entrepreneurs who are car washers, shoe- 
shiners, or vendors of specialty items, souvenirs, crafts, and foods, 
These highly visible members of the sector, however, are not an accurate 
indication of the range of activities within the sector or of how many 
people depend on such activities to earn a living.
A close look at households in urban areas turns up a surprising 
number and variety of very small informal business activities that 
augment a family's income or even support the entire family. For example, 
in poor neighborhoods in metropolitan San Jose, Costa Rica, microenter­
prises were found in one out of every eight houses and provided an 
average of 70 percent of each family's income (6., p. 15). The enterprises 
are typically involved in furniture-making, shoe-manufacturing, tile 
production, cooking or baking, bicycle repairing, sewing, and much 
more. In Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, estimates based on data from 
the 1970 census indicate that workers in the informal sector were 
involved in the following activities (56>, p. 120):
Services of repair and activities like painter,
electrician, plumber, mechanic, shoe mender: 44%
Manufacturing of clothes, shoes, and furniture: 34%
Marginal services as street vendors or shoe-shiners: 10%
Services directed to the formal sector such as
washing and ironing, waiting tables, cutting hair: 6%
Transportation services: 5%
Information on Jakarta, Indonesia, from the 1967 census indicates 
that 27 percent of workers in the informal sector were involved in
3
4services, 21 percent in trade, 19 percent in transportation-storage- 
communications, and 16 percent in construction. Smaller percentages 
were also active in agriculture and related industries, manufacturing, 
financial institutions, and public utilities (67. table 70).
While the economic activities within the sector vary considerably, 
urban informal enterprises share a number of common elements. One well- 
known study of businesses in the informal sector, The Pisces Studies. 
identified several characteristics of microenterprises in the sector.
The enterprises are (12, p, 3):
(a) Ubiquitous (i.e. street vendors, hawkers, cobblers, 
etc. are found in every city); (b) small-scale (e.g. the 
average number of persons engaged in industries in Sierra 
Leone is 1.8, the average value of the stock of traders 
in Haiti is US$17.00); (c) localized (i.e. businesses 
meet the needs of low-income people); (d) labor-intensive:
(©) low-income (i.e. though higher than agricultural 
workers the income of informal sector workers is general-, 
ly lower than unskilled workers in the formal sector);
(f) low profits and little capital for investment; (g) 
competitive markets.
These characteristics are a strong indication that an enterprise is not 
registered with the government, has no access to formal cred.it insti­
tutions, business advisory services, or formal marketing channels, and is 
consequently a participant in the city's informal economic sector.
In the rural areas and small towns of developing countries, 
informal enterprises produce and provide all kinds of goods and ser­
vices. In fact, "the available evidence indicates that the vast majority 
of the existing rural nonfarm enterprises in developing countries would 
fall in the 'artisan and informal enterprise' category” (16. p . 11).
Studies have estimated that in most developing countries, 30 to 50 
percent of the rural labor force engages in nonfarm activities as either 
their primary or secondary source of employment (16. p . 6), In addition 
to the characteristics listed above for urban enterprises, these busi­
nesses must contend with the poor infras true ture usually found in rural 
areas.
As the International Labour Office noted in 1984, ”the emergence 
of the informal sector as an important source of employment...is in a 
sense a reflection of the failure of development planning and policies 
pursued" (2Z, p . 13). The path of economic development chosen by many 
countries emphasizes capital intensive industrialization and extensive 
integration into the international economy. The cost of creating jobs in 
capital intensive industries is so high that even though most resources 
have been invested in the formal sector, the level of job creation has 
been insufficient. Furthermore, many countries have concluded that 
low-priced labor is their "comparative advantage" that allows them to 
sell exports competitively on the international market. The low price of
5labor is easily maintained if labor is overabundant. The situation is 
well described in the following quote (55,, p. 140):
Firstly, the natural rate of population growth aggravated 
by migration of large numbers of peasants from the rural 
areas has meant that the rate of urbanization has far 
outstripped that of industrialization under the pre­
vailing conditions of capitalist economic development; 
and secondly, the inability of the industrialization 
process to absorb into the urban productive labor force 
the large numbers of unskilled illiterate workers, rural 
and urban born, has resulted in immense poverty and 
unemployment for considerable portions of the urban 
population.
Substantial labor force underutilization, high levels of rural-urban 
migration, and widespread participation in the informal sector are all 
manifestations of this type of economic development. They are magnified 
by rapid population growth.
In both rural and urban areas, the prevalence of the informal 
sector can be interpreted as a necessary response to insufficient employ­
ment opportunities. A limited number of workers may choose to leave 
formal sector jobs to begin their own firms in the informal sector (73, 
p. 108). However, most participation in the informal sector can be 
attributed to the inability of the formal sector to provide enough jobs 
for the population. The informal sector is composed of many people who 
have created their own jobs. This concept of job creation is one charac­
teristic that initially differentiates informal entrepreneurs from their 
small-scale counterparts in the formal sector. The primary motivation for 
beginning an informal enterprise is frequently employment creation, while 
formal enterprises are usually begun with profit maximization as the 
primary motivation (69, p. 17).
In Latin America, the following estimates of labor force under­
utilization of the economically active population around 1970 give an 
indication of the necessity of creating one's own employment (58.
Table 1.9) :
Brazil: 32%
Colombia: 29%
Mexico: 25%
Venezuela:■ 24%
Chile: 22%
Argentina: 13%
Where one-quarter of the labor force is underutilized, becoming a vendor 
or setting up a microenterprise in the informal sector may be the only 
survival strategy for many members of the disadvantaged classes.
High levels of labor force underutilization are compounded by 
rapid population growth. In simplistic terms, the inability of the
6agricultural sector to absorb the growing rural labor force has both 
increased participation in rural off-farm activities and encouraged high 
levels of rural-urban migration. Migration, coupled with natural popu­
lation growth, is causing dramatic increases in urban populations. The 
expanding urban labor force cannot be absorbed by the formal sector, 
which leaves residents to create their own jobs.
As Table 1 shows, population growth rates were well over 2 percent 
per year in all of the developing world. In most regions, the urban labor 
force was growing over twice as fast as the rural labor force. The table 
also indicates that the rural labor force, except in Latin America and 
the Caribbean, was growing considerably faster than the labor force in 
agriculture, revealing an increasing need for nonfarm sources of income.
In rural areas, the logical result of this type of population and 
labor force growth is increasing pressure on land and decreasing agricul­
tural incomes. The percentage of landless or near-landless rural house­
holds is already very high in developing countries (55 to 85 percent in 
ten Latin American countries and 53 to 78 percent in five Asian coun­
tries) and may increase by half again by the year 2000 (18, pp. 6-7, 54). 
Nonfarm activities are consequently indispensable for the economic 
survival of many rural families, as Table 2 shows.
Inadequate access to land, rapid rural population growth, and low 
incomes have made informal off-farm income-generation necessary for rural 
residents. They have also convinced other rural residents to seek employ­
ment in the cities. Many rural workers and entire families have migrated 
to large cities, leading to a phenomenal increase in urban populations. 
From 1950 to 1970, migration caused over 45 percent of the urban growth 
in Nepal, Indonesia, Kenya, Ghana, Malaysia, Bolivia, and Nigeria (71, 
p. 99). High levels of rural-urban migration have contributed to the 
inability of the urban formal sector to accommodate the work force.
Rural-urban migration, rapid population growth, and national 
development strategies are interacting to help make the informal sector 
the only source of income for many rural and urban residents. As a 
result, the informal sector in many countries has been growing consi­
derably faster than the formal sector. The, growth rates of the economi­
cally active population In each sector from 1960 to 1970 in selected 
Latin American countries shows how rapidly the informal sector is growing 
(58, Table 1.8):
COUNTRY
Argentina
Venezuela
Nicaragua
Guatemala
Mexico
Trinidad & Tobago 
Chile
Informal Sector 
Growth Rate
5.7
5.5
5.1
5.0
4.0 
2.9
2.2
Formal Sector 
Growth Rate
1.3
3.4 
4.0
3.5
3.8
2.8 
1.8
7<D
M3
3
U
*HPtoo
< 1
f" - CTt
t—I o
CM vO 00• ♦ .
pH o o
-K
o
p'.
CT\
!“HI
o
vo
cr\
COwH
5
fflH
6  O 
Pd O
H< 1
P
wuPi
o
[p
pi
oFQ
< 1
P
O
5
S3
o
H
£-H
<d
p
p
Ph
O
P
P
c
<uu
M
a)
CJ
o
Mo
[p
p
opcd
P
1—1
cd crv On vO 00 vO
p • ■ ■ « . • •
pd
(—1 P rH P o o
§ O c0 CPv CO OV
p ' « • • * * •
P lo CM mT CO
P
t—i
cd CM CO CO CT\ M f
p . » . . * •
O
H
CM P CM P T—1 CM
cd
p
CO CT\ p CM Mf o
CM i—1 CM CM P rH
piP
opD
0
vOcd o O CO
P • • • * • ■
p
P
to to CO to
p 00. cd vO Mf I''. ■vt
P » • • • •
o
p
CM CM (N CM <N CM
pp
pq
<cH
cd ■ pi
o . cd
•H QJ
P Pip P<1 ■H
O Pi
*H P cdtp P U
Pi ■H P
O O o cd
p cd £3 o
too cd cd P4 *H4) O o — cd QJ P
pd ■H *H cd p P L QJ
P Pi •H CO 0 s
<P tp CO < P <4
<i <1 3
P W P i
p P p p 1 ■H
CO CO CO o P P
cd 4> cd o •H cd
P 3= P CO S P
^A
da
pt
ed
 f
ro
m 
De
nn
is
 A
nd
er
so
n 
an
d 
Ha
rk
 R
ei
se
rs
on
, 
Ru
ra
l 
En
te
rp
ri
se
 a
nd
 N
on
fa
rm
 E
mp
lo
ym
en
t 
(W
as
h­
in
gt
on
, 
D.
C.
; 
Th
e 
Wo
rl
d 
Ba
nk
, 
19
78
),
 p
. 
56
.
8TABLE 2. GROWTH RATES AND LEVELS OF NONFARM EMPLOYMENT 
IN SELECTED COUNTRIES*
(percent)
Rural Nonfarm 
Average Annual
Nonfarm Share of 
Rural Labor Force
Country Period
Employment 
Growth Rate
Initial
Period
End
Period
Taiwan 1955-66 9.4 30 49
Kenya 1969-74 8.8 NA NA
Philippines (Gapan 
area) 1961-71 8.5 NA NA
Mexico (Sinaloa) 1960-70 5.6 14 23
Indonesia 1961-71 5.5 17 24
Iran 1956-73 4.8 20 33
India 1953-60 4.0 NA NA
Afghanistan
(Paktia) 1964-71 3.9 NA NA
Korea 1960-74 3.2 18 19
* Source: Enyinna Chuta and Carl Liedholm, Rural Nonfarm Employment:
A Review of the State of the Art (E. Lansing, Mich.: Michigan State Uni­
versity, 1979), p. 18.
9One consequence of these differing growth rates is that informal 
activities in some sectors of many urban economies are more prevalent 
than formal activities. For example, in Jakarta in 1967, more than 60 
percent of all employment in construction, public utilities, and 
transport-storage-communication, was in the informal sector. In services, 
32 percent of all employment was in that category, as was 22 percent of 
the employment in manufacturing (67. Table 70). In the Dominican 
Republic, the International Labour Office has estimated that 22 to 24 
percent of urban employment in the entire country corresponds to the 
informal sector (56>, p. 105). The situation in Peru is even more dra­
matic, with up to 65 percent of the economically active population 
employed in informal sector activities. In Lima, 65 percent of employment 
in construction, 85 percent in tailoring, 78 percent in furniture making, 
and 95 percent in public transportation are in the informal sector 
(39). Table 3 shows the importance of the urban informal sector to 
developing countries around the world.
Barriers to Higher Incomes and More Jobs
Considering these high percentages and the sector’s expansion, it 
is surprising that governments have made so little effort to address the 
many constraints on informal firms. In both rural and urban areas govern­
ment policies and other factors discriminate against informal enter­
prises, implying that a more favorable environment could increase jobs 
and incomes within the sector. In terms of day-to-day activities, micro­
entrepreneurs in the informal sector generally run up against the 
following problems (adapted from 9, pp. 3-4):
• a hostile policy environment that requires either complex, expensive, 
and time-consuming registration, or the payment of bribes;
• a lack of institutional credit because banks feel that lending to 
small enterprises is too risky and expensive;
• high interest rates charged by informal sector moneylenders;
• a lack of management skills making business expansion less likely and 
more risky;
• a limited access to raw materials and supplies, partly because of an 
inability to buy large quantities;
• marketing problems partly due to a limited access to profitable 
markets.
Some of these constraints need to be addressed on a policy level and some 
are operational constraints that can be addressed on a program level. All 
of the constraints contribute to low profits and incomes for micro- 
enterpreneurs. They impede the expansion of the individual businesses and 
the initiation of new enterprises,
10
TABLE 3. ESTIMATED SHARE OF LABOR FORCE IN THE INFORMAL SECTOR IN 
SELECTED DEVELOPING CITIES*
City Year Percent
Africa
Abidjan (Ivory Coast) 1970 31
Lagos (Nigeria) 1976 50
Kumasi (Ghana) 1974 60/70
Nairobi (Kenya) 1972 44
Urban areas (Senegal) 1976 50
Urban areas (Tunisia) 1977 34
Asia
Calcutta (India) 1971 40/50
Ahmedabad (India) 1971 47
Jakarta (Indonesia) 1976 45
Colombo (Sri Lanka) 1971 19
Urbans areas (W. Malaysia) 1970 23
Urban areas (Thailand) 1976 26
Urban areas (Pakistan) 1972 69
Latin America
Cordoba (Argentina) 1976 38
Sao Paulo (Brazil) 1976 43
Urban areas (Brazil) 1970 30
Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) 1972 24
Belo Horizante (Brazil) 1972 31
Urban areas (Chile) 1968 39
Santo Domingo (Dominican Republic) 1973 50
Guayaquil (Ecuador) 1970 48
Quito (Ecuador) 1970 48
San Salvador (El Salvador) 1974 41
Federal District and State of Mexico 1970 27
Mexico D.F., Guadalajara, and Monterrey 1970 42
Asuncion (Paraguay) 1973 57
Urban areas (Peru) 1970 60
Urban areas (Venezuela) 1974 44
Caracas (Venezuela) 1974 40
Kingston (Jamaica) 1974 33
^Source: S. V. Sethuraman, The Urban Informal Sector in Developing
Countries (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1981), p. 43.
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In Rural Areas
In rural areas many of the policy constraints of the off-farm 
sector are closely tied to those of the agricultural sector. It is 
exceedingly difficult for small-scale rural entrepreneurs to transport 
their products profitably to large towns or urban markets. Instead, the 
nonfarm sector often depends upon local agricultural incomes to create a 
demand for its goods and services. If agricultural product prices are 
kept low in urban areas and access to agricultural inputs are limited, as 
they are inmost developing countries, the low income of farmers impedes 
purchases of products and services from the off-farm sector.
At the same time, it should be mentioned that even though low 
rural incomes constrain off-farm businesses, it is not evident that 
higher incomes would necessarily support those businesses. Farmers with 
higher incomes may be less likely to engage in off-farm activities and 
less likely to make local purchases.
There are other factors that handicap both on- and off-farm rural 
enterprises. Inadequate rural infrastructure, such as electricity, 
running water, and roads, prevents the initiation of many productive, 
income-generating activities. It is difficult for rural businesses to 
attain needed inputs, which may have to be transported from long dis­
tances, or to gain access to markets, which often are located far 
away. The problems in becoming formal are magnified for rural enterprises 
because transportation to and from government offices requires consider­
able time and expense.
In Urban Areas
Different policy-related problems curtail the income-generating 
opportunities in the urban informal sector. Informal activities generally 
take place in a negative, or at best neutral, policy environment. In many 
cases, the technically illegal status of enterprises necessitates bribes 
for small manufacturers and invites harassment by public officials. 
Governments have generally failed to realize the important safety-valve 
function of the informal sector as an employer of high percentages of 
urban populations that might otherwise be without a source of income (68,
p. 202):
Clearly, there is a greater need to appreciate the merits 
of the sector.... The main aim in such a change in policy 
environment is not only to eliminate restrictions pre­
venting fuller participation by the informal sector but 
also to foster its growth over time....It may also include 
modifications in prevailing policies and attitudes at 
regional or local government levels that have a direct 
responsibility for this sector on a day-to-day basis. The 
important consequence of such a change seems to be on the 
access to resources and markets. It is clear that the 
problem of ''access” is at least partly derived from the
12
prevailing policies and attitudes toward this sector though 
the existing socio-economic structure also plays a very 
important role.
Poor access to resources refers to both institutional credit and 
inputs. Without credit, microentrepreneurs in the informal sector find it 
difficult to buy in bulk and as a consequence must pay a higher price for 
inputs than formal sector enterprises. In terms of markets, informal 
enterprises may have a harder time, or be prohibited from, selling their 
wares in certain locations that are available to formal enterprises. They 
are unlikely to receive any government contracts, which are a con­
siderable portion of the formal economy. In addition, they may only be 
able to expand to a certain size before government officials decide to 
close them down and cease accepting their bribes.
One might think that an easy solution to many of these problems 
would be for the small firms to register legally with the government. In 
many cases, however, that is a long and difficult process. Researchers in 
Peru recently attempted to set up a small formal enterprise in Lima (63. 
P- 3):
They found that the registration process involves 
completion of over 600 separate "tramites"--the Spanish 
word for "paperwork.” This would require more than six 
months, working 40 hours a week and paying a minimum of 
four unavoidable bribes, for someone merely to register 
to do business. The equivalent process in a Florida city, 
which the ILD (Instituto Libertad y Democracia) also went 
through, took about four hours.
Nor does the bureaucratic nightmare end when the 
business begins. The ILD also found that the average 
Peruvian manager of a small firm in the formal private 
sector spends 44 hours a month coping with government red 
tape.
In the Informal-Formal Relationship
The informal sector also suffers through its relationship with the 
formal sector. The informal sector often provides cheap inputs to enter­
prises in the formal sector as well as cheaper wage goods for the workers 
in that sector. Therefore, part of the ability of the formal sector to 
generate a surplus can be attributed to the informal sector. The formal 
sector actually "appropriates at least a part of the surplus generated in 
the informal sector" (£S£, p. 31).
Moreover, it is often the case that informal firms are more 
directly exploited by formal businesses through sub-contracting. A formal 
sector factory that buys raw materials from informal enterprises may 
protect itself from labor problems and changes in demand while enjoying a 
low-priced and efficient source of inputs. In effect, the factory 
externalizes some of its risks. The informal enterprises, on the other
13
hand, are very vulnerable to market changes. The following quote explains 
some of the potential problems of sub-contracting (55, p. 146):
Firstly, it effectively fractionalizes its (the fac­
tory’s) labor force and severely impedes any attempt at 
true collective wage bargaining; secondly, it permits the 
factory to avoid problems that arise due to the fluctu­
ations of the market and to provide the necessary 
flexibility to cope with changing demand. The combination 
of piecework and independence of the suppliers... serves 
to keep efficiency high and costs low. The income of the 
...(suppliers) is low....
Being informal, there is little that the exploited enterprises can do to 
alter the situation.
In Terms of Credit and Services
Many of the constraints described above can only be corrected by 
structural changes or shifts in government policy. Some constraints, 
however, are within the reach of microenterprise promotion programs. Lack 
of credit is nearly universally regarded as the major constraint on 
microbusinesses in developing countries (21, p. 142). In a survey of 
microenterprises in Lima, 68 percent of the entrepreneurs cited working 
and/or investment capital among their three priority needs (54, 
p. 59). In El Salvador, informal firms suffer from production dis­
continuities because the low level of capital available does not allow 
the entrepreneurs to purchase enough raw materials. The entrepreneurs are 
unable to extend credit to customers, to seek better prices for their 
products, or to obtain quantity discounts (21, p . 169).
Banks and other formal financial institutions cite a variety of 
reasons for not wanting to lend to small producers. First of all, because 
the application process is usually geared towards large producers, the 
cost of making a small loan is at least as high as that of a larger 
loan. As profit-seeking institutions, it is logical for banks to prefer 
making five $10,000 loans to making five hundred $100 loans. The former 
option has fewer transaction costs, is easier, and is consequently more 
profitable. Secondly, microentrepreneurs are viewed as very risky because 
they cannot offer physical collateral. Thirdly, even though it has been 
argued that default rates are actually lower among small businesses than 
large (73,, p. 80), some banks claim that small production units are not 
credit-worthy (1, p. 43):
Apart from transaction cost and risk factors, these units 
do not usually borrow for production purposes; they lack 
technical knowledge of their craft and market conditions; 
they are difficult to supervise, being widely dispersed 
and some of them highly mobile, and often vulnerable to 
market fluctuations which in turn render them easily 
vulnerable to bankruptcy.
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Without access to institutional sources of credit, entrepreneurs 
in both rural and urban areas must rely on extremely high interest loans 
from moneylenders. Credit is available in the informal sector at usurious 
interest rates, as the accompanying nominal interest rates for rural 
areas of selected countries from 1967 to 1970 indicate (71, p. 161):
Country Informal Formal
Nigeria 200% 6%
Bolivia 100 9
Ghana 70 6
Mexico 60 10
Honduras 40 9
Indonesia 40 14
Philippines 30 12
El Salvador 25 10
India 25 9
Capital in the informal sector is obviously much more expensive than in 
the formal sector. Its high cost curtails investments and consequently 
limits the productive activities and employment possibilities within the 
sector. Programs that provide credit at more reasonable rates to enter­
prises ineligible for formal credit can help remove this capital con­
straint.
A lack of management skills or business education may also curtail 
the growth or limit the profitability of many microenterprises. Some 
entrepreneurs see expansion and the hiring of additional workers as 
imprudent, partly because of managerial problems. Indeed, rational 
microentrepreneurs, much like poor farmers, cannot afford to take big 
risks because their margin for survival is quite slim. One mistake can 
ruin a microenterprise and destroy what might have been the sole source 
of income for a family. Among microenterprises in Brazil, an extensive 
study by Judith Tendler noted that "many owners felt that expansion 
would bring them up against barriers that they would not be able to 
overcome... or that would require a tremendous expenditure of energy and 
resources to overcome" (73, p . 118). Basic business assistance or 
management training may give entrepreneurs a better understanding of how 
to overcome some of the barriers confronting them. It may be prudent for 
some enterprises to remain quite small. However, for other entrepreneurs, 
those with the motivation to expand and the appropriate enterprise, 
programs that provide business assistance may help diminish the barriers 
and risks to expansion.
Programs may also be able to address some of the problems that 
informal firms have in their relationship to formal businesses. Support 
in arranging beneficial contracts with formal firms or in gaining easier 
access to inputs and markets may make it easier for microentrepreneurs to 
take advantage of economic opportunities.
Ill - MICROENTERPRISE PROMOTION PROGRAMS
Providing microenterprises in the informal sector with access to 
credit and assistance, the primary activities of most microenterprise 
promotion programs, can have both an immediate and long-term beneficial 
impact on the microentrepreneurs themselves and on the sector as a 
whole.
Influence on Government and Bank Policies
Microenterprise programs can contribute to policy changes by 
altering government attitudes towards the informal sector. Programs that 
reach large numbers of entrepreneurs, achieve high loan repayment rates, 
increase employment and incomes within the sector, and show a potential 
to be financially self-supporting will help convince policy makers of the 
merits of the enterprises in the informal sector. Governments may be 
inclined to create a more favorable policy environment once they are 
convinced of the viability and importance of informal firms in reaching 
the poorest segments of the population and in providing jobs, incomes, 
goods, and services.
Financial institutions may also begin to view the sector more 
favorably. As the programs discussed below will show, many programs prove 
the credit-worthiness of informal microentrepreneurs. The programs are 
achieving very high repayment rates, meeting their costs, and some are 
even producing a profit. Furthermore, the demand for credit at reasonable 
interest rates is immense. The informal sector in many areas is actually 
a huge, potentially profitable, as yet untapped, credit market for 
financial institutions. Commercial lending programs, if properly de­
signed, can benefit all parties involved. Banks can make a profit; 
entrepreneurs can get loans at interest rates lower than the rates of 
moneylenders in order to stabilize, improve, or expand their businesses; 
and governments can see more people productively employed and with higher 
incomes.
Improvement in Economic Opportunities
Many programs, as the case studies will indicate, are already 
showing the immediate benefits of microenterprise promotion. The po­
tential for job creation in the informal sector is immense, as "no other 
sector of the economy, whether government or private, can create jobs so 
rapidly and at such low cost" (64, p. 4). Many assisted enterprises hire 
more employees or are able to support full-time, instead of part-time, 
workers. Participants in programs enjoy increased profits, higher 
personal incomes, and lower levels of underemployment.
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In addition to the employment- and income-generating benefits of 
microenterprise promotion, there are other reasons for assisting informal 
firms, There is considerable evidence that small enterprises are more 
labor-intensive and use their limited capital more efficiently than 
larger enterprises (38* P- 6). As such, they make better use of the 
developing country's abundant and scarce resources (labor and capital, 
respectively) than larger firms. Moreover, small firms often are more 
flexible than larger ones, enabling them to adapt and diversify their 
activities depending upon local opportunities and interventions. A recent 
cost-benefit analysis of five microenterprise programs carried out by 
economist Peter Kilby for the Agency for International Development 
concluded that, relative to other categories of development assistance, 
microenterprise lending programs are the "most successful" (44). The 
study found that such programs produce economic benefits that usually 
outweigh their costs. The record for many other types of development 
programs, including those assisting larger businesses and industries, is 
not nearly as positive.
Beyond assisting the microentrepreneurs themselves, an appropriate 
intervention can have multiplier effects and strengthen local economies 
through backward and forward linkages. For example, an entrepreneur who 
receives credit may increase purchases from a local raw materials 
supplier. The increased profitability of both businesses Is reflected in 
the higher levels of consumption of both families that, in turn, helps 
the local businesses that supply basic goods to the community. There are 
other types of linkages that may be promoted by microenterprise programs. 
Programs may increase the clients' access to raw materials, markets, or 
information by arranging contracts between clients and formal firms.
Microenterprise promotion is also one of the most effective means 
of reaching the poorest of the poor and thereby contributing to a more 
equitable income distribution. Program eligibility requirements and 
design effectively discourage the participation of entrepreneurs with 
large asset holdings or access to formal credit and services. Besides, 
the poor are already "more proportionately represented or more readily 
assisted in activities like small trading, crafts, fishing, small 
livestock, women-controlled production, charcoal making, peddling..."
02, p. 53).
Rural off-farm and urban informal sector enterprise development 
also tends to improve the economic position of women. Microenterprises 
are frequently women-owned and -managed enterprises and may provide the 
sole source of income for many female-headed households. Studies in Latin 
America have found that the informal sector has proportionately more 
female participation than the formal, even when domestic services are not 
included as Informal activities (70, p. 359), An emphasis on micro­
enterprise development increases the involvement of women in production- 
oriented development projects, helping to reverse the tendency to target 
them with welfare-oriented projects that fail to lead to economic 
independence (see 14). Moreover, there is substantial evidence that a 
larger proportion of a woman's income goes toward family consumption than 
the income of a male household head. Such research indicates the need for
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Increasing womenfs access to income-generating activities as a way to
improve family welfare.
The benefits described above are all potential outcomes of 
microenterprise promotion programs. They can be summarized and simplified 
into four program objectives:
• increase incomes and standards of living of program participants;
• decrease underemployment and create new jobs;
• reach a large number of poor informal sector microentrepreneurs;
• be a financially sustainable program, potentially self-sufficient, or 
even profitable.
Any program that reaches a large number of poor entrepreneurs and 
increases their incomes has a positive impact on its participants, many 
of whom will be women, and on the local economy. Such a program also 
helps policy-makers recognize the merits of firms in the informal 
sector. A financially sustainable program may tempt governments Into 
setting up similar credit schemes for microenterprises, while a pro­
fitable program could entice banks (some of which are already involved) 
into the untapped market. In sum, the extent to which a microenterprise 
program meets these four objectives indicates, in part, its ability to 
benefit poor microentrepreneurs and to contribute to an improvement in 
the conditions of the informal sector as a whole.
Unfortunately, this recommendation of microenterprise promotion as 
a solution to many problems in the informal sector must be qualified. 
Small enterprises can be exploited through unfavorable links to formal 
sector firms. In such situations, assistance to Informal enterprises may 
increase their level of exploitation by formal businesses. The benefits 
of assistance may be expropriated by the formal firms. Moreover, 
assisting some entrepreneurs may be at the expense of others in similar 
activities, causing job displacement and an actual decrease in local 
employment opportunities. The result is increased inequity within the 
sector, a situation of informal "haves" and "have-nots." A microenter­
prise program that contributes to either situation does not have much of 
a beneficial impact. The dilemma has no obvious solution. However, an 
understanding of the local economic; links between the sectors and within 
the informal sector may allow programs to avoid promoting these un­
favorable situations. There are programs that enourage activities 
that are unlikely to cause displacement and forge intra-sector links that 
will create more economic opportunities for informal firms through fair 
contractual arrangements.
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Program Designs
The options in program design for microenterprise projects are 
numerous. The key to a successful project lies in choosing the right 
combination and design of components for the selected participants 
and program objectives.
Economic Level of Participants
The first variable that must be decided is the economic level of 
entrepreneur to be assisted. Even within the informal sector the size and 
complexity of the economic activities differ considerably. Both the 
vendor who buys cigarettes and sells them individually and the ceramacist 
or furniture maker with invested capital and eight employees are members 
of the informal sector. There is a continuum of the scale of enterprises 
within the sector, from the part-time cigarette vendor to the full-time 
manufacturer. For this analysis, the continuum has been divided into 
three levels of enterprise or entrepreneur (adapted from 4, pp. 20-22).
Level I beneficiaries are subsistence level entrepreneurs, 
involved in rather unstable economic activities, who have no significant 
amount of capital invested in their businesses. This level includes 
street vendors who buy their stock daily (or even more often) in small 
quantities, people who make and sell small amounts of candy or bread, and 
household entrepreneurs who manufacture or fix things with limited 
capital invested. Level II enterprises have some capital invested, are a 
little more established, but are not very stable. A tailor with a sewing 
machine, a furniture maker with some simple tools and an assistant or 
two, and a vendor with a shop location might all be considered in level 
II. The highest level, III, includes the rest of the informal sector that 
might be reached by microenterprise programs. They may have a significant 
amount of capital invested, a relatively stable and well-established 
enterprise, and numerous employees. A shoe manufacturer with machinery 
for cutting leather, a tile-maker with molds or presses, and a baker with 
an oven and a store would all fall under level III. Some programs reach 
more than one level of entrepreneur. However, different program designs 
are more appropriate for different levels of entrepreneurs. For example, 
very small, short-term loans may meet the needs of level I entrepreneurs 
but not be of much use to level III entrepreneurs.
Objectives
Just as the target populations vary, so do the Immediate project 
goals. For example, some programs are designed to aid established enter­
prises , while others attempt to promote new enterprises. Programs 
designed for street vendors may be aimed at stabilizing their employment, 
increasing their incomes, and supplying them with access to a secure line 
of credit. A project geared towards small manufacturing enterprises may 
attempt to improve their profits, facilitate their interaction with
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formal firms and institutions, and bring the entrepreneurs together so 
that they can buy inputs in bulk, address mutual marketing problems, or 
organize around other shared concerns. A project aimed at larger, more 
stable manufacturing enterprises may supply credit and business assis­
tance so that the enterprises expand and employ more people. Program 
staff may hope to "graduate" successful entrepreneurs out of the program 
and into the formal sector where they have access to bank credit at 
commercial interest rates, to government contracts, and to other possible 
advantages. Though programs may have different specific objectives, in 
general they attempt to create employment and increase incomes. Their 
success is enhanced if they reach many people and approach financial 
self-sufficiency so that the program can be institutionalized.
Implementing Organizations
Depending upon the economic level of participants, objectives, and 
available local resources, the most appropriate vehicle of implementation 
is either a formal financial institution, a community development organi­
zation, a government agency, a local group, a private agency, or some 
combination of the above. Programs with empowerment or organizational 
objectives are probably better implemented by a local community agency 
than a bank. A private agency may need to work with a bank to set up a 
loan fund for small manufacturers. No matter what the arrangement, it is 
crucial that the staff be highly motivated and agree with the objectives 
of the program. They must avoid both a paternalistic and a bureaucratic 
attitude and be able to adapt to the needs of the clients. The program Is 
Initially promoted through the staff but, if it meets a recognized need, 
can be self-promoting within a short period of time.
Credit Component
The primary component of microenterprise programs is usually a 
credit scheme. How credit Is disbursed varies according to the type of 
implementing organization, its objectives, and the targeted level of 
entrepreneur. The credit eligibility requirements effectively determine 
the economic level and type of participant. They also determine whether 
or not a client must be a member of a group to receive a loan. Groups are 
usually formed by three to eight friends or acquaintances and collec­
tively guarantee a group loan, part of which each member receives to use 
as individually determined. A group leader collects payments from the 
members to pay the credit agent of the lending institution at the 
required Intervals. Other programs determine credit-worthiness through an 
orientation program, attendance at courses, character references, or an 
economic assessment of the enterprise by staff. All Include some sort of 
application that must be approved. The eligibility requirements and 
application process will determine, Indirectly, the time It takes for a 
loan application to be processed.
Program staff must decide the size of the loans and the payback 
installments, the payback period, the effective interest rate, and
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whether or not there are any payback incentives or disincentives. Some of 
the programs grant very small first loans that increase in size if 
payment is on time. Others grant comparatively larger loans, depending 
upon the enterprise and proposed use of the funds. Some have standardized 
loan sizes and payback periods while others tailor each loan to the 
specific client.
Other Components
In addition to credit, programs may provide direct business 
assistance to clients. Classes in accounting, marketing, and management 
may be offered, or even required, for program participants. Another 
option is for staff to visit the enterprises individually, offering 
informal advice and recommendations. Staff may even help clients to 
identify profitable opportunities or to locate better markets or sources 
of inputs. Entrepreneurs can be charged a fee for this assistance or it 
can be provided for free.
Programs may have an organizational component that consists of 
giving the participants the opportunity to get together and discuss their 
needs. If the program is centered around a community, such an opportunity 
may lead to the formation of a formal community association. If the 
program reaches a certain economic level or class of entrepreneur, 
participants may unite around problems that affect their businesses. They 
may decide to make contributions to build a warehouse, purchase inputs in 
bulk, start an emergency fund, or even construct a community center. It 
is also possible that a microenterprise program be incorporated into an 
organization formed for other reasons, such as advocacy or local com­
munity development.
Some programs may include a forced or voluntary savings com­
ponent. Clients may be required to deposit a certain percentage of 
their loans or weekly incomes in a personal savings account that can be 
drawn upon In times of sickness or emergency.
Outcomes
How these many options are decided will directly affect the extent 
to which a microenterprise program meets the four basic objectives of 
increasing employment, raising incomes, reaching large numbers, and being 
financially sustainable. However, the economic and social environment in 
which the program takes place, a factor beyond the reach of the program 
participants and implementors, may have an even larger impact on the 
program's outcomes. If an area has an entrepreneurial tradition, a 
growing economy, and a growing population, even a poorly designed and 
implemented program may be able to benefit fairly large numbers and 
achieve some level of financial self-sufficiency. On the other hand, a 
well-designed program may need constant financial support in order to 
have a very limited impact in a sparsely populated area with a stagnant 
economy and no entrepreneurial tradition. In the latter situation, a
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successful program may be a heavily subsidized one that slows the 
economic demise and the increasing underemployment in the area. Programs 
in both types of environments (and all types in between) need to be 
supported. Their impacts will vary considerably. It is imperative to keep 
in mind that while some programs are very Impressive in terms of the four 
objectives and some seem without much impact, they are all taking place 
in very distinct and uncontrollable economic environments. The challenge 
is to use these diverse experiences to determine what types of programs 
or program designs are most likely to have the largest impacts; it is not 
to label the programs as successes or failures according to the number of 
jobs created, the level of increased income, the number of clients, or 
the program's level of financial self-sufficiency.
Experiences from the Field
In order to compare the different approaches to microenterprise 
development, information was gathered on over twenty programs from around 
the world. Each program was broken into its various individual components 
(such as credit and business assistance) and its design (such as eligi­
bility requirements and payback periods). The program's effectiveness in 
meeting the four objectives of increasing employment, raising incomes, 
reaching large numbers, and being financially sustainable was assessed. A 
limited number of the projects were selected as examples and are pre­
sented, along with their basic design, in Table 4. They appear in the 
order in which they are referred to in the text The explanation 
following the table should facilitate frequent referrals to the table 
whenever specific programs are mentioned as examples of the issues 
discussed in the remaining chapters.
\JA brief narrative description of each program, along with the 
source(s) of the information, can be found in the appendix in the same 
order.
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COLUMN EXPLANATION OF TABLE 4
1 The first column, composed of the letters "a" through "o," gives the location of 
the program in the table and in the appendix. These letters are included in the 
text the first time that each program is mentioned.
2 The second column identifies the program by its abbreviated name and gives a brief 
description of where the program operates.
3-6 Columns three through six indicate the effectiveness of the program with regard to 
the four objectives. The first three impacts are judged as either low (L), 
medium (M), or high (H), while the fourth is measured by the actual numbers reached. 
The letters refer to the program's effectiveness with regard to each assisted enter­
prise. For example, a program assisting 100 enterprises that helped create an 
average of five jobs per enterprise would receive an "H." A program assisting 1000 
enterprises but creating very few jobs would receive an "L."l/
3 The extent to which the programs decreased underemployment or created new jobs can 
be found in column three.
4 The programs' ability to help raise the incomes and standards of living of partici­
pants is indicated in column four.
5 Each program's financial sustainability, primarily assessed by the amount of opera­
ting costs which the program itself covers, is revealed in column five.
6 Column six gives the total number of clients reached in the time period Indicated, 
the yearly average, and the number of loans extended. All three figures were 
included when available and they serve as an indication of the scale of each 
program.
7-11 The variables within the credit component of each project are briefly described in 
columns seven through eleven.
7 Column seven indicates which economic level of beneficiary the program reaches (with 
I as the poorest and III as the wealthiest, as discussed in the text).
8 The eligibility requirements for participating in a program or for receiving a loan 
are summarized and described in column eight.
9 The approximate size of loans disbursed is indicated in column nine.
10 The payback structure is briefly explained in column ten. There is an indication 
of how frequently payments must be made, the period of time in which the total loan 
must be repaid, and the effective interest rate.
11 2/Column eleven reports the repayment rate of the various programs.—
12 Column twelve mentions any components, in addition to credit, that each program 
includes. If the program provides classes, direct business assistance, or a struc­
ture that encourages organizing among clients, they are noted in this column. Any 
savings components are also included here.
13 Lastly, in column thirteen, the type of organization^) involved in the implementa­
tion of the program is described.
1/ The low, medium, and high measurements are obviously subjective, but were assessed 
as fairly as possible from a comparative examination of the available program evaluations. 
The socio-economic environment greatly influenced these outcomes but is not measured.
2_i Many of the program evaluations and descriptions use different definitions for 
determining whether or not a payment is late or unrecoverable. Therefore, these figures 
should not be rigorously compared between projects but, instead, viewed as a general indi­
cation of how effective the program is in having funds repaid.
IV - FOUR PROGRAMS: FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO THEIR SUCCESS
The results of the first four programs summarized in Table 4 are 
impressive in terms of the four objectives. The programs also have 
similar methodologies. After a brief description of each of the four 
programs, the common elements which have contributed to their positive 
impacts will be examined. Limited reference will also made to other 
programs included in the table and the appendix.
Profitable Lending to the Poor: the BKK Program
The Badan Kredit Kecamatan program (BKK: Table 4, Row a) was 
launched in Indonesia in 1972. The program's objective is to supply 
capital conveniently to the rural poor for off-farm income-generating 
activities. There are local BKK units located in 482 of Central Java's 
492 sub-districts and they receive loans from the Central Java Provincial 
Development Bank. The local BKKs can approve small loans, while larger 
ones are approved at the sub-district level. Clients choose from six 
different loan options with effective monthly interest rates ranging from 
5.6 percent for a six-month loan to 10.8 percent for a 22 day loan. Eli­
gibility is based on character references of village headmen and there is 
little screening except in trying to ensure that the loan is for pro­
ductive purposes and not consumption. There is also a forced savings 
program for borrowers.
Survey results from an external evaluation indicate that the 
businesses of most borrowers have expanded and that one-quarter of 
the clients have begun new economic activities. The program has had a 
moderate effect on employment while considerably decreasing the under­
employment of participants. It has contributed to village and area 
development, particularly through backward linkages. The Government 
subsidizes the program by paying the salaries of one-third of the BKK 
staff who are usually local primary school graduates. However, a 7 
percent return on the average portfolio makes the program financially 
viable and "one of the few publicly funded and administered credit 
programs in the world that makes money from providing loans to small 
enterprises" (27, p . xiv). Other aspects of the program that help explain 
its success are reflected in the following comment (27, p. xxi):
The program’s success is the result of a complementary 
blend of political support and accountability, decentra­
lized operations and control, skilled external financial 
and administrative supervision, lending terms and pro­
cedures that offer the convenience of moneylenders at much 
lower cost, a socially cohesive and homogenous setting, and 
a moderately expanding economy. The absence of one of these 
factors without a replacement performing the same function
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could doom programs based on the BKK model before they are 
ever established.
Assisting the Landless __in Bangladesh:.fheGrameenBank
The Grameen Bank program of Bangladesh (GBL: Table 4, Row b) is 
also geared towards the rural poor, especially women and the landless. 
After several years of being a program of the Bangladesh Bank, the 
Grameen Bank Ltd. was instututionalized in 1983 as an autonomous finan­
cial institution with its own charter to extend unsecured credit to 
landless individuals and groups. The program operates in over 1,100 
villages and is decentralized into branches, each with a field manager 
and six bank workers. The bank workers explain the program and require­
ments to prospective clients who organize themselves into groups of 
five. Every five or six groups is federated into a center, of which there 
are typically one or two per village depending upon village size. Indivi­
dual borrowers, nearly half of whom are female, receive their own loans, 
are eligible for repeat loans, and make weekly payments to the bank 
worker at the center meetings. The workers supervise up to five centers; 
clusters of centers are supervised by resident district managers, who are 
in turn supervised by the headquarters office in Dhaka.
There is a required group savings fund to which each member must 
contribute weekly and for which 5 percent of each loan amount is de­
ducted. Any group member can borrow from this fund in a time of need at 
terms fixed by the group. There is also a group emergency fund, intended 
to be used as insurance against loan defaults, to which each borrower 
must pay an amount equal to 25 percent of the interest charges. With 
these mechanisms, the savings performance has been impressive, with over 
US$536,000, or $15.50 per borrower (16 percent of the country's average 
annual per capita income), being saved by July 1983. Increases in 
participants' Incomes have also been impressive. The average per capita 
income of the borrowers' households has increased.in real terms by 35 
percent in two and one half years and the project is increasing con­
sumption, capital formation, and investments in housing. The program has 
decreased underemployment for most borrowers and actually helped initiate 
new income-gene rating activities for the 65 percent of the women and 2.5 
percent of the men who entered the program claiming that they had no 
ongoing income-generating activity. At current interest rates of 16 
percent, a GBL branch can cover its costs within three years and then 
begin to contribute to program overhead costs. The program is subsidized, 
but cash flow projections suggest that the entire operation can break 
even and may even make a profit within ten years.
Group Loans as a Means to Reach the Urban Poor: San Salvador
The PRXDEC0/FEDECCREDIT0 program in El Salvador (F/F: Table 4, 
Row c) is also based on a group credit scheme but operates in the urban
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areas of San Salvador. PRIDECO, an urban community development organi­
zation, provides services to FEDECCREDITO, the coordinator of the 
country's 42 affiliated credit agencies, in order to supply credit to the 
city's informal sector entrepreneurs. The beneficiaries, 86 percent of 
whom are women, live in 37 of the poorest neighborhoods of San Salvador. 
They form themselves into "solidarity" groups of five to ten members and 
go to the PRIDECO office where loan applications for each individual are 
filled out. Soon thereafter, a PRIDECO staff person visits each member to 
verify the application information. Each client is also visited briefly 
by a FEDECCREDITO person who explains the responsibilities and benefits 
of credit. P/F staff calculate the appropriate loan size and frequency of 
payment. Each group selects a leader who collects payments from the other 
members on an agreed upon schedule and then makes payments to the 
FEDECCREDITO agent. If one group member does not pay, the amount 
missing is proportionately subtracted from the payments of the other 
members. Officially, every member of the group becomes behind in their 
payments. In this way, each member is directly responsible for the entire 
group. Prompt repayment leads to larger loans for longer periods of 
time.
Program participants generally use their loans to expand inven­
tories of raw materials and stock in order to increase production and 
sales. Most have shown increases in incomes and levels of consumption. 
The program charges commercial interest rates and FEDECCREDITO, in 1979, 
was expecting to cover its costs within the next year. The PRIDECO 
operating costs will probably have to remain subsidized, but add up to 
less than US$1500 per month.
Immediate Results in Quito: PRODEM
The fourth program is the Program for the Development of Micro- 
enterprises in Quito, Ecuador (PRODEM: Table 4, Row d), which was 
begun in May 1984. “the program has a solidarity group component for the 
poorest beneficiaries and an individual microenterprise component for 
slightly larger enterprises. Group size ranges from three to eight 
members, with most groups at the lower end of the spectrum. Groups form 
themselves, select a leader, and then contact the program. A staff person 
visits them, makes sure they understand the program, and fills out a loan 
application. Individual borrowers in the microenterprise component are 
also visited by a staff person who fills out an application with infor­
mation on the individual and the business. In less than two weeks, the 
entrepreneur or group receives the loan. Loans begin very small, even 
for individual borrowers, but are immediately increased upon prompt 
repayment. Effective interest rates are higher than those of commmercial 
banks, but much lower than those charged by informal sector money­
lenders. The program also has a forced savings component.
The results from the first eight months of the program are 
impressive, although it is impossible to determine whether or not they 
can be maintained. Many individuals and groups have already received more
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than one loan. Program staff report that clients see the benefit of the 
forced savings component and that there is considerable evidence of 
increased employment and higher incomes. Some of the most remarkable 
aspects of the program, however, are that in just eight months it is 80 
percent financially self-sufficient and has reached at least 1500 bene­
ficiaries .
Similarities in Program Design
All four of these programs, though operating in different economic 
environments, have been successful with regard to the four criteria of an 
effective microenterprise program. Perhaps most impressive is that they 
each provide an extremely high number of very poor people (ranging from 
900 to 21,000 yearly) with a needed service in a nearly self-sufficient 
manner. As a result, the programs have the potential to be institu­
tionalized to provide this service for as long as it is needed. There are 
few development programs that can make this claim.
Participation by the Poorest
Interestingly, all four programs were designed for the poorest 
level or levels of entrepreneur (levels I and II) and have high per­
centages of female participation. They are effective at working at this 
level because all of the projects' components are designed with this 
level in mind. Programs designed to meet the needs of very large bor­
rowers have eligibility criteria, loan sizes, and payback schemes geared 
towards those borrowers. They are consequently ineffective and not 
cost-efficient for small borrowers. For that reason, lending to small 
borrowers has appeared too costly and risky to formal financial institu­
tions. On the other hand, as the four examples indicate, programs 
designed for the small borrower discover that the small borrower is an 
extremely credit-worthy client who can be served inexpensively.
Self-selection and Self-promotion
The first variables of the credit component that are different for 
a program reaching the poor, as opposed to a commercial lending program, 
are the eligibility requirements. As these four programs indicate, a 
character reference or credit group approach with the promise of larger 
future loans can avoid lengthy and costly visits to the businesses, 
accelerate the loan application process, and result in repayment rates 
well above 90 percent. The character reference by the village headman 
required in the BKK program is unique and can be used only in societies 
with a similar village structure. However, it relies on the same basic 
concept as the group credit approach: the local people themselves know 
who the good credit risks are. Because the groups are formed by the 
beneficiaries themselves, the clients, and not the program staff, select 
credit-worthy individuals. Few people will join a group with someone who
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has a poor reputation for paying back loans or for being dishonest. Be­
cause the clients are self-selected in this manner, the costs and time 
required for program staff to select clients are minimized. In sum, it is 
an extremely effective method of selection: the poorest entrepreneurs are 
reached; there is no discrimination against women; loans can be disbursed 
quickly; costs are minimal; and repayment rates are high. Another benefit 
of a credit group approach that will be discussed later is that it can 
lead to the formation of local organizations with objectives beyond just 
receiving and paying back credit.
The four programs need very limited promotion, beyond an initial 
phase which lets people know of their existence and policies, because 
they are providing a service which is in great demand. Word among small 
entrepreneurs travels extremely quickly. In its first eight months PRODEM 
has had to slow its lending activities because the demand for credit has 
exceeded the supply of loan funds. Potential borrowers approach a 
successful program in search of a loan. Program staff do not have to look 
for eligible clients and then convince them of the merits of the pro­
gram. Promotion is another costly activity that these programs minimize.
Small Initial Loans and Frequent Payments
In all four programs the initial size of loans is very small and 
is geared towards the poorest entrepreneurs. In addition to discouraging 
the participation of wealthier businesses, the small initial loans 
minimize the program's risk. If a client, or group, does not repay the 
first loan, the program's financial loss is minimal and no significant 
fund decapitalization takes place. Prompt repayment of small initial 
loans proves to program staff that the borrower is credit-worthy and 
knows how to use that size loan productively. The second, slightly larger 
loan, proves the same thing at a higher level. The entrepreneur, reali­
zing that prompt repayment literally assures the availability of future, 
larger loans, indeed, the availability of an entire line of credit, does 
everything possible to maintain a good credit record.
The loan repayment schedules are designed to make it easy for a 
small entrepreneur to maintain a good credit record. The schedules 
reflect the level of economic activity taking place. In general, payments 
can be made daily to the group leaders or weekly to the program staff. 
Where capital is scarce, it is imprudent and inappropriate to demand that 
poor entrepreneurs accumulate their money at home to make relatively 
large payments monthly or even less frequently. The consumption needs at 
this level are too demanding. It is feasible, however, for the entre­
preneurs to put a little aside daily or weekly to slowly pay back their 
loans. Furthermore, most enterprises at this level operate with minimal 
cash flow but fast turnover. A program participant who receives a loan 
may be able to buy more of a needed input at a lower price, and manu­
facture and sell more of a product, all within a week. In a short period 
of time the entrepreneur notices the increased income and can continue 
buying in larger quantities. The buy-manufacture-sell cycle is usually 
quite short and should be reflected in the loan repayment cycle.
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CommerclaLInterest Rates
Another common variable within the credit component of the four 
programs is that the interest rates are not subsidized. They are at least 
as high as commercial rates and, in the case of PRODEM, higher than com­
mercial rates. Although this issue will be discussed more thoroughly in 
the following chapter, briefly, the reasons for high interest rates 
are: (1) it promotes the financial self-sufficiency of the program; (2) 
it discourages participation by entrepreneurs who have access to credit 
at commercial rates; and (3) it provides entrepreneurs with an incentive 
to "graduate" to formal credit institutions where the interest rate is 
lower.
Cooperation with Formal FinancialInstitutions
As these variables within the credit component illustrate, the 
four programs effectively adapted lending practices to their low-income 
clients. Formal financial institutions play different roles in each of 
the four projects. The BKK program was actually set up and implemented by 
a bank. With government encouragement and support, the bank developed a 
methodology different from its standard lending practices in order to 
reach the rural poor. The Grameen Bank began as an intermediary between 
the poor and the national commercial banks in order to facilitate loans 
to the landless. When martial law was declared in 1982, the Government 
rescinded the order mandating that commercial banks cooperate with the GB 
project and the banks were put under pressure to improve their regular 
lending programs. Realizing that the banks would no longer cooperate 
fully with the GB project, the Grameen Bank Ltd. became an autonomous 
financial institution.
The P/F program is an example of full cooperation between a 
national credit agency and a community organization. PRIDECO has exten­
sive experience working with the poor in the city and FEDECCREDITO knows 
how to run a loan program. Cooperation between the two facilitates 
lending to the poor. PRODEM, uniike the others, has thus far capitalized 
its loan fund through grants from international development organi­
zations . However, because of the enormous demand for credit, PRODEM may 
receive a loan from one of Ecuador's commercial banks that would be 
protected by an outside guarantee and help expand the program. Even if 
banks help capitalize the loan fund, PRODEM probably will continue 
to administer the funds to clients without additional bank involvement.
These examples reflect a variety of ways in which banks can be 
involved in microenterprise projects. An effective arrangement gives 
field staff of the microenterprise promotion agency enough bank support 
to operate in the field with autonomy, responsibility for selection, and 
the flexibility to determine appropriate loan sizes, payback schedules, 
etc. This division of labor limits the bank's role in assessing loan 
eligibility and in pursuing delinquent borrowers, two tasks that banks 
cite as raising their loan costs above a profitable level.
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The advantages of involving banks are that it introduces them to 
the poor, a population with whom they rarely conduct business, and it may 
convince them of the viability of lending to that population. It also 
can introduce the poor to banks, an institution that may have always 
seemed quite intimidating and unapproachable to a relatively assetless 
entrepreneur. This is especially true If the borrowers have to go 
directly to the bank for some of the financial transactions, as they do 
in the program in Monterrey, Mexico (ADMIC: Table 4, Row e).
Removal of One Barrier at a Time
That the programs address only one constraint at a time reduces 
their costs and allows them to reach large numbers. The programs do not 
provide skills training, attempt to improve markets or access to inputs, 
or even actively promote any type of advocacy by the clients. They simply 
help remove lack of capital as a major barrier to business improvement. 
PRODEM offers courses, but they are not required for individual borrowers 
until after the second loan. In essence, once lack of credit is no longer 
the major constraint and borrowers have learned to use their line of 
credit, the program begins to address the lack of business education. The 
courses are not provided to entrepreneurs for whom credit is still the 
major constraint.
An International Labour Office evaluation also concluded that 
success is more likely in programs that address only one constraint at a 
time. After evaluating eight cottage industries and handicrafts programs, 
they determined that "the relatively successful projects... have 
generally sought to provide a single ingredient or to remove a single 
bottleneck" (1, p. 109). The programs evaluated in this analysis confirm 
that conclusion. Simpler programs are easier to implement, less costly, 
and more likely to reach larger numbers. However, some situations may 
require more extensive assistance. These situations and the program 
designs that can meet their needs are discussed in the following chapter.
The savings funds that three of the four programs require are 
an additional approach to the same objective of removing a capital 
constraint. A fairly stable but small enterprise can be ruined by 
a family sickness that requires immediate cash. The entrepreneur may 
have no choice but to sell what is invested in the business or to borrow 
from the local moneylender at usurious interest rates. An entrepreneur 
with a savings account may be able to pay the emergency expenses without 
borrowing and preserve the operations of the business. Although poor 
entrepreneurs may initially complain about a required savings component, 
they tend to recognize quickly the benefits of such a program and 
actually enjoy the increased security and self-esteem that their own 
savings give them. In addition to benefitting the clients, a savings 
component can benefit the program by increasing the capital of the loan 
fund.
The fact that three of the four programs have a savings component 
also substantiates the assertion that the poor can save, accumulate
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capital, and reinvest it. It is frequently argued that the immediate 
consumption needs of the poor make it impossible for them to save or to 
expand their businesses (33. p. 5):
The poor have no resources, little training or economic 
skills and frequently cannot even invest the time unless 
the returns are immediate. Their first financial returns 
cannot be reinvested in the business unless urgent living 
requirements are satisfied.
However, there is considerable evidence that the poor do save and 
reinvest in their businesses. Required savings in the three programs does 
not appear to deter program participation. The BKK evaluators found that 
over 40 percent of the clients had other savings accounts in addition to 
the BKK forced savings program. In the Self-Employed Women's Association 
program (SEWA: Table 4, Row f) encouraging, but not requiring, savings 
among women has been an integral part of the banking activities (66. 
p.84):
The experience of the SEWA bank demonstrates both the 
capacity and willingness of poor women to save. At the same 
time, it has provided the basis for establishing a sound 
financial institution.. ..SEWA's experience reflects the
importance of this element (mobilizing indigeneous sources 
of capital in the context of providing credit to small 
scale entrepreneurs and the poor) in credit programs. By 
the end of 1976, the volume of savings allowed the SEWA 
Bank to begin advancing loans from its own resources.
The poor can save if given the opportunity and incentive. However, 
if the only place that they can keep their money is at home, they may be 
much less likely to accumulate an amount sufficient to tide them over a 
time of emergency or to make a substantial investment in an enterprise.
V - FACTORS THAT CAN LIMIT PROGRAM SUCCESS
Many factors threaten the success of a microenterprise project, 
especially the context in which the program operates. No program can 
control whether or not an area has an entrepreneurial tradition, a 
growing economy, or a widely dispersed population. Creating jobs and 
increasing the incomes of large numbers of people in a financially 
sustainable manner may be impossible in some contexts and relatively easy 
in others. On the other hand, there are factors that programs do control 
that may decrease their impact unnecessarily. Many programs have com­
ponents or designs that limit their ability to reach large numbers 
inexpensively but do not increase substantially their effect on job 
creation or income-generation. In other words, they needlessly sacrifice 
two measures of success for the misguided notion that that sacrifice will 
improve their ability to increase Incomes and employment. Financial 
sustainability may be sacrificed simply because a program is not designed 
with potential self-sufficiency in mind. Likewise, the ability of the 
program to reach large numbers may be sacrificed by providing business 
education which may or may not be of much value. This chapter explains 
some of the reasons why many programs do not meet the four objectives as 
successfully as the programs discussed in the last chapter. In so doing, 
frequent reference is made to the programs described in Table 4 and in 
the appendix.
Subsidized Interest Rates
There are two schools of thought on the interest rate issue: some 
argue that rates should be subsidized and others that they should cover 
the lending costs of the program. Although many programs offer subsidized 
rates, the argument against subsidizing is far stronger than the argument 
for it. One obvious problem with subsidized interest rates is that they 
tend to lead to fund decapitalization, especially in economies with high 
inflation rates. For example, in the Rural Development Fund project in 
Peru (FDR: Table 4, Row g), the real interest rate ranged from negative 
12 percent to negative 42 percent, depending upon the rate of inflation. 
The loan fund was rapidly decapitalized and administrators had to raise 
the interest rate to a positive level to reduce erosion of the fund. In 
contrast, the evaluators of the BKK program attributed part of the 
program's success to charging interest rates high enough to maintain the 
fund and cover the program's costs. By contributing to fund decapitali­
zation and financial dependency, subsidized rates create institutions 
with little possibility of becoming self-sustaining.
Subsidized rates also encourage borrowers with access to formal 
credit at higher market rates to attempt to participate in programs that 
are designed for poorer entrepreneurs who have no access to formal 
credit. Likewise, they discourage participants from moving on to
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commercial sources of credit. Participants in programs with subsidized 
rates are also more likely to view the program as a charitable insti­
tution than a financial institution. Consequently, they may be less 
inclined to repay their loans promptly.
In addition, the interest rates that the poor are accustomed 
to paying on the informal market are exceedingly high, showing their 
willingness to pay high rates to borrow for productive activities. In the 
FDR program, evaluators concluded that the low interest rates were not a 
prerequisite to either project success or the economic survival of the 
borrowers. Evaluators of the Northeast Union of Assistance to Small 
Businesses program (UNO: Table 4, Row h) found that clients stressed the 
favorable payment period, not the low, subsidized interest rates, as the 
most desirable aspect of the program. Both the UNO and FDR programs rely 
on external injections of capital to maintain their loan funds.
A report on the SEWA program found that the repayment rates of 
clients paying 4 percent and 12 percent interest annually were not 
significantly different. They concluded that many poor women can pay 
commercial rates of interest and that lending programs for the poor do 
not need to subsidize their interest rates. Judith Tendler, who has 
carried out several extensive studies of credit programs, agrees with 
this conclusion (73. p . 70):
Highly subsidized interest rates, in sum, are felt to be 
unnecessary in order to lend to the poor. They undermine 
attempts to make institutional credit available to the 
poor, and they encourage investment in low yield activi­
ties .
The argument for subsidizing interest rates is not nearly as clear 
or persuasive. Initially, perhaps, practitioners felt that interest rates 
for the poor should be low simply because of the poverty of the clients. 
The wealthy receive so many subsidies that forcing the poor to pay for 
their services is quite unfair. Subsidizing interest rates became the 
only thing to do because of "political, social, and economic realities" 
(16. p . 72). Today, it seems to be tradition, more than anything else, 
that encourages interest rate subsidization (72. p. 72):
Subsidized rates are so common a tool of credit and 
development policy--not only in today's third world but in 
the histories of the industrialized countries--that one 
would have had to abstain from development assistance if 
one refused to finance programs using them. In this policy 
context, it seems unreasonable...to expect (a small 
program) to charge more for credit to the small borrower, 
in the name of economic wisdom, than is currently being 
charged for credit to the large.
Though they may be fairer, subsidized interest rates do not enhance a 
program's ability to serve the poor and actually threaten the sustaina­
bility of loan programs.
35
Extensive Promotion and Selection Activities
Another manner in which some programs needlessly increase their 
costs, and thereby reduce their potential for self-sufficiency and for 
reaching large numbers, is by including costly promotion activities and 
eligibility requirements. Obviously, eligibility requirements should 
encourage the participation of targeted entrepreneurs and preclude the 
participation of others. They should help avoid loans to people unlikely 
to repay them. Requirements such as 100 percent collateral or extensive 
financial information will limit the participation of poor entrepre­
neurs. Such requirements may be appropriate for evaluating loan appli­
cations of larger entrepreneurs who have financial records and are 
requesting large loans. They are not, however, an appropriate or cost- 
effective way to assess the credit-worthiness of small borrowers. As a 
matter of fact, many programs have found "no relationship between the 
amount of information collected on a client and his promptness at 
repayment" (]2f p. 116).
Both the UNO and the Micro-Industries Development programs show 
how extensive eligibility requirements can dramatically increase a 
program's costs and limit the number of beneficiaries without signifi­
cantly improving payback rates or the economic performance of the 
clients' businesses. For the first six years of the UNO program, client 
selection consisted of a costly four-stage process: (1) a census of 
microenterprises in a specified area; (2) a selection visit to see if a 
firm was interested in credit and met UNO's criteria; (3) an assessment 
of the business' finances, costs and outlays, assets and debits; and (4) 
an account-building process for the credit application. With such an 
involved process, only about 27 percent of the enterprises surveyed ever 
completed loan proposals, and only 17 percent actually received loans. 
However, in 1981, UNO combined the last three stages into one. Loan 
proposals as a percentage of firms surveyed immediately increased to 50 
percent and average cost per loan declined by 30 percent. The change had 
no apparent effect on the high repayment rates.
The Micro-Industries Development Program in the Philippines 
(MIDP: Table 4, Row i) also performs expensive feasibility studies on 
even very small enterprises. Their objective is to select and provide 
assistance to those enterprises that have the most potential for 
generating employment. Despite this objective, "employment generation by 
MIDP businesses has not been great" (10, p. 125). The program has proven 
to be quite costly, and less than 300 businesses were assisted in the 
first two years. Some of the problems with the selection process are 
pointed out in the following quote (10, p. 133):
The client selection process is skewed too much towards 
presenting the application for MIDP credit assistance,...
MIDP currently uses a project feasibility format which 
presents... detailed costings and cash flow analyses, 
beyond the needs of the enterprise and the reach of the 
entrepreneur. While appraising the likelihood of payback is
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essential for maintaining character loans, this exercise 
tends to dominate staff time. MIDP staff should be learning 
how to assess client needs (credit, training, management) 
and to "pick winners".
Picking winners, or entrepreneurs likely to repay loans and create 
employment, can be extremely difficult for program staff, especially if 
they are trying to minimize costs. Letting local people assess credit- 
worthiness is more effective. In the Philippines, the Self-Employed 
Program (SELP: Table 4, Row j) has implemented an innovative method of 
using community leaders as volunteer credit agents. The community 
leaders, chosen through their own participation as clients in the 
program, are entrusted with a small loan fund. At their discretion, they 
grant very small "trial1’ loans (from US$3 to $16) to local entrepre­
neurs. Prompt repayment of the trial loans qualifies the clients for 
larger loans from the program. The system is efficient, with a repayment 
rate close to 100 percent, and inexpensive because the community leaders 
are volunteers. The leaders are motivated to work for the program because 
of various incentives: they themselves are clients and receive priority 
loans; the position carries significant prestige within the community; 
they participate in courses and social functions sponsored by the 
program; and they can even use their extensive business contacts within 
the community to further develop their own enterprises.
SELP, along wittythe BKK, GBL, P/F, and PRODEM programs show that 
local people are more efficient at assessing credit-worthiness than 
program staff. There are inexpensive and effective ways of selecting 
credit-worthy entrepreneurs that increase a program's ability to reach a 
large number of enterprises.
Business Education: High Costs and Poor Results
Financial sustainability and the ability to reach many people 
may also be sacrificed by the inclusion of an extensive business edu­
cation component in microenterprise programs. Teaching better business 
practices is intended to increase the likelihood that entrepreneurs will 
repay on time, use loans productively, expand their operations, and 
create more employment. Overall, the case studies indicate that providing 
effective assistance or training to the microentrepreneur is the most 
difficult and most expensive project component. They also indicate that 
such business assistance is not the best way to ensure prompt repayment 
or to promote business expansion and job creation.
Repayment Rates
The repayment rates in themselves do not justify courses or formal 
training as a means to promote prompt repayment. The programs with 
business courses (Table 4, Rows d, e, h, i, j, k, 1, m, n) do not have 
repayment rates significantly different from the programs with no formal
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educational component. As a matter of fact, the MIDP program, with its 
extensive eligiblity requirements and required management and accounting 
courses, had a repayment rate of only 87 percent with more than 35 
percent of payments in arrears. The "line of credit" approach used by 
other programs, including BKK, GBL, PRODEM, and P/F, is much less 
expensive and perhaps more conducive to prompt repayment. The latter 
programs offer small initial loans that, if used productively, allow the 
entrepreneur to repay on time and gain access to progressively larger 
loans. The entrepreneur learns to use credit through experience with 
small loans and has a powerful incentive to pay back loans on time. Con­
sequently, an educational component cannot be justified by its contri­
butions to high repayment rates. Less expensive methods are at least as 
effective.
Business Improvement and Expansion
More than for encouraging prompt repayment, however, programs 
include an educational component because of its potential benefits to the 
client, the business, and the local economy. Most development practi­
tioners seem to feel that entrepreneurs are more likely to increase their 
own incomes, improve local economies, and, most importantly, expand and 
hire more workers, if they receive business training. However, when the 
difficulties and costs of implementing an effective educational component 
are considered along with the impacts of that component, the case studies 
suggest that education is not the most effective way of promoting employ­
ment in microenterprise programs.
The first difficulty with business training arises because 
microentrepreneurs frequently fail to perceive their own need for 
training, the potential benefits of training, or the relevance or 
importance of what is being taught to their own enterprise. Consequently, 
their motivation to participate and learn is minimal. For example, few 
clients attend the voluntary courses in bookkeeping, sales promotion, and 
check-writing that are offered to UNO project participants, and fewer 
still find them valuable. "Most of those who attended the courses said 
that they 'could not put anything they learned into practice"' (73, 
p. 96).
Some programs require attendance at courses before a participant 
can receive a loan. Such motivational tactics, however, have not been 
particularly successful in promoting better business practices. In 
Burkina Faso (then Upper Volta), the staff of the Association for 
Productivity program (APP: Table 4, Row k) found that few of the clients 
used the managerial assistance provided with the loans. Staff shifted the 
training concentration from bookkeeping to working capital management and 
general business planning but still found that clients ranked the 
training component very low in importance and usefulness. A.T. Inter­
national found the same results in its study of MIDP and SELP in the 
Philippines. The reviewers concluded that it was quite logical that 
clients felt their training was useless since few of the enterprises 
would ever be large enough to use the training. Courses initially given
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to P/F participants in mini-bookkeeping, sales, and very simple notions 
of cost analysis were discontinued because they were "ineffective and not 
well received" (21., p. 180):
The material was too sophisticated, even though an attempt 
was made by the instructors to keep the subject matter very 
simple. Furthermore, the subjects taught were not perceived 
as immediate priorities for the businesses.
In order to be effective, training must be fitted to the level of the 
entrepreneurs and to the needs that they themselves recognize.
Even if appropriate training can be offered to microentrepreneurs, 
they may not wish to expand or hire employees. Although it is debatable, 
limited research indicates that a significant portion of informal 
sector businesses may not want to expand, meaning that business assis­
tance may increase their profits but is unlikely to promote job 
creation. In Cordoba, Argentina, only 20 percent of the informal firms 
surveyed were interested in expanding (.69, p. 156). In the FDR program, 
profiles of a small sample of aided entrepreneurs revealed a desire to 
use any increased income to improve the family's standard of living 
rather than to expand the enterprise. The UNO evaluation reports similar 
findings, that entrepreneurs showed increased profits but felt no 
need to expand. Providing business education to entrepreneurs that have 
no intention of expanding may greatly increase the costs of a program 
without increasing the program's impact on job creation.
It appears, then, that business education does not motivate 
entrepreneurs to expand. It may, however, provide already motivated 
entrepreneurs with the ability to expand. For example, staff of the 
Dominican Development Foundation program (FDD: Table 4, Row 1) discovered 
that microentrepreneurs who were younger, better educated, in business 
for four to five years, and frequently with that business as their sole 
source of income, were quite likely to adopt the tools offered in 
training programs. Among program participants of any level, only a small 
percentage are going to be likely to take advantage of courses, expand, 
and hire more workers,
Consequently, it is not cost-effective to require all partici­
pants of a program to attend business courses. This finding is cor­
roborated by a recent cost-benefit analysis of five microenterprise 
programs that determined that technical assistance added very little to 
the value of the projects (44). Courses should be provided only to those 
entrepreneurs who show a desire to learn and to expand their busi­
nesses. For example, clients of PRODEM must attend courses before their 
third loan. The third loan is usually for about US$300 and is approved 
for clients who have successfully repayed two smaller loans. In the SELP 
program, participants must also take courses before their loans reach a 
certain size. These entrepreneurs are already using their credit effec­
tively, paying their loans back on time, and are probably more likely to 
expand. The courses support growth and expansion, but are not intended 
to cause or stimulate it.
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Another way to assure that those entrepreneurs receiving courses 
are motivated to improve or expand their businesses is to charge a fee 
for the courses. As the coordinator of the Port Sudan program (Table 4, 
Row m) asserts (65):
The best service to a small business is rendered by another 
small business.... Services rendered free of charge are 
subject to suspicion as to their quality or relevance or 
else to the motives of the agency; serious people appreci­
ate and honour straight-forward contractual relation­
ships .
Entrepreneurs who pay to attend classes are likely to be more motivated 
to learn than those who are required to attend courses that are free. The 
payments also help the program to defray the costs of formal training.
In sum, business courses can help promote expansion among certain 
entrpreneurs, but may have a relatively limited impact if they are 
required of all program participants. If the program has an extensive 
selection process, like ADMIC, MIDP, and the Program for the Development 
of Small Business (DESAP: Table 4, Row n), then an attempt can be made to 
admit only those entrpreneurs who will benefit from the courses. Unfortu­
nately, it is difficult for program staff to pick those entrepreneurs and 
both the courses and the selection process are very costly. In the ADMIC 
program, 64 percent of all costs in 1982 were for promotion, courses, 
visits, and assistance.
Overall Program Impact
In addition to being costly, a very limited number of entre­
preneurs can be assisted by programs that emphasize education. The varied 
socio-economic contexts and internal resources and capabilities of 
microenterprise programs cast doubt on the validity of directly comparing 
the numbers of clients assisted. However, the difference between the two 
types of programs in the numbers of entrepreneurs reached is of such a 
magnitude to justify the comparison. The comparison reveals that it is 
extremely unlikely that programs stressing education can create enough 
jobs with enough of an impact through linkages in the economy to make up 
for the small number of entrepreneurs directly assisted.
The ADMIG program, in its first four years, provided loans to 240 
businesses and assistance to 455. One can estimate that the program 
reaches an average of 115 businesses each year, though a smaller number 
receives credit. The MIDP program assisted approximately 246 firms in 
four years, averaging 62 a year, DESAP enrolled 1,300 entrepreneurs in 
its training programs in four years, for a yearly average of 325. The 
three programs together assist approximately 502 businesses each year, or 
an average of 167 enterprises each. All three emphasize their business 
education component, are costly, and are unlikely ever to approach 
self-sufficiency.
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In contrast, the P/F program provides loans to an average of about 
912 clients yearly. PRODEM, extrapolating from its first eight months 
and assuming a conservative average of four members per credit group, 
will reach a yearly average of at least 2,000 entrepreneurs. Together the 
two programs reach 2,912 microentrepreneurs yearly, for an average of 
1,456 each, and operate their programs relatively self-sufficiently. If 
these 1,456 entrepreneurs created one job each (i.e., each client who was 
50 percent underemployed became fully-employed and hired one half-time 
assistant; each fully-employed entrepreneur hired one full-time assis­
tant; or each client with no previous income-generating activity suc­
ceeded in becoming fully employed), then they would create 1,456 new 
jobs.
The 167 businesses assisted by the programs stressing education 
would each have to create more than eight jobs to have the same impact on 
employment as those stressing credit. That each of the 1,456 microenter­
prises could create one job each is doubtful, but that each of the other 
167 firms could create an average of eight jobs each is even more 
unlikely. For example, an evaluation of DESAP found that the average 
number of jobs per microenterprise that received credit increased from 
3.8 to 5.1 (40, p. 55), or by slightly more than one employee. This 
increase is among those clients that received courses and credit (464 in 
four years). The number of jobs created by each of the 1,300 entre­
preneurs enrolled in the training programs, most of which had not yet 
received loans, is undoubtedly even lower.
Furthermore, if the BKK and GBL programs are added to the calcu­
lations, the 167 firms receiving extensive business training would have 
to create an average of over 68 jobs each to have the same average impact 
on employment as the other four programs. No matter how many jobs the 
credit-intensive programs help create, it is implausible that the 
programs stressing education can create 8 to 68 times as many jobs. It is 
not easy for the benefits of a business education component to outweigh 
its high monetary costs or its costs in terms of the limited number of 
entrepreneurs reached.
At this point, one might argue that the entrepreneurs reached by 
credit programs like BKK, GBL, F/D, and PRODEM are unlikely to create any 
jobs. A loan might help them decrease their own underemployment and 
increase their own incomes, but they would probably increase their 
families’ level of consumption instead of investing in their businesses. 
Their impact on employment would consequently be minimal whereas better- 
off businesses, those reached by ADMIC, MIDP, and DESAP would be more 
likely to be able to reinvest in business growth and expansion. While 
this is a valid argument, it is not likely that the better-off businesses 
will create between 8 and 68 times as many jobs.
Furthermore, the ability of microenterprise programs to stimulate 
job creation depends more on the type of activity assisted than on the 
level of beneficiary. Evaluations of the BKK and GBL programs reported 
significant levels of employment creation even though they work with the 
poorest of entrepreneurs. Microenterprises involved in commerce, such as
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street or market vendors and shopkeepers, will not create many jobs. 
Enterprises involved in small manufacturing activities, however, such as 
shoe-makers, tailors, or furniture-makers, are able to create a signi­
ficant number of jobs regardless of their economic level. The poorer 
segments of the informal sector are disproportionately represented in 
commerce activities because those activities require minimal capital 
investment. Nonetheless, the programs that reach these vendors also reach 
microentrepreneurs involved in manufacturing. Evaluations of BKK, UNO, 
and FDR all indicate significant levels of employment creation. None of 
the three emphasized an educational component and the three reached all 
three levels of entrepreneur.
It might also be argued that the linkage effects of programs 
geared towards poorer beneficiaries will be quantitatively less than if 
larger businesses are assisted. While this is true, the linkage effects 
of level I businesses will tend to be more influential on the poorest 
sectors of the economy, where even a small increase in business or income 
can have a large impact. This is not to say that there is a dual economy, 
simply that each economic level within a society tends to conduct much 
of its economic transactions within its own levels.
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VI - APPROACHES TO MICROENTERPRISE PROMOTION: SOME CONCLUSIONS
Thus far, the components of microenterprise programs that tend to 
increase or decrease a program's effectiveness have been examined. It 
remains to link these to the several methods of microenterprise promotion 
followed in the developing world.
Traditional versus Nontraditional
In general, programs that promote microenterprises in the informal 
sector can be divided into three types: traditional, nontraditional, and 
systems. Those that stress education can be called "traditional" and 
those that stress credit "nontraditional". Stephen Gross, who has 
extensive experience in working with microenterprise promotion programs 
in Latin America, prepared the following table which compares these first 
two approaches.
The table depicts fairly accurately the differences discussed 
between programs that stress education and programs like BKK, GBL,
P/F, and PRODEM. Nontraditional programs are designed for self- 
sufficiency with high interest rates, promotion and selection primarily 
done by the clients, and an emphasis on credit instead of education. How­
ever, the programs stressing credit in this analysis do not always meet 
the criteria of the nontraditional programs as presented in the table. 
Payback periods are frequently longer than four months and the programs 
are unlikely to reach financial self-sufficiency within two years. That 
nontraditional programs reach 400 new clients yearly with education can 
only apply to programs like PRODEM that have an educational component. It 
is difficult to determine whether or not they actually create 900 jobs 
yearly. Lastly, that there is an incentive in nontraditional programs to 
graduate to commmercial banks may very well be true. However, there is 
little evidence that graduation is much more than an uncommon exception 
for participating microentrepreneurs. In general, though, the table 
reflects the evidence from the case studies that programs emphasizing 
credit are more effective in terms of employment- and income-generation 
than those that stress education.
That programs emphasizing education reach primarily better-off 
entrepreneurs while the more effective programs reach levels I and II 
does not mean that programs should only target levels I and II. Nor does 
it mean that programs should not include courses as a means of improving 
business management skills. Although larger businesses may not be the 
poorest, they still suffer from a lack of credit, and sometimes a lack of 
business education, which limits the potential of even the most motivated 
entrepreneur. Whether these larger businesses can be assisted by the same 
type of program that is proving effective for smaller businesses is as 
yet unknown. Because the larger businesses often require larger loans, it
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TABLE 5. CHARACTERISTICS OF "TRADITIONAL" AND "NONTRADITIONAL" 
PROGRAMS FOR MICROENTERPRISE PROMOTION*
"Traditional" "Nontraditional”
Obj ectives
Business size 
Emphasis 
Loan size
Use of loans
Payback periods
Interest rates
Time lapse from 
initial program 
contact to loan 
disbursement
Learning experiences 
in use of credit in 
one year
New clients served 
in. one year
Loans disbursed in 
one year
Jobs created in 
one year
Financial self- 
sufficiency
Promotion and 
selection
"Graduation" to 
commercial banks
Create and strengthen 
employment; increase 
incomes
Larger
Education
US $800-$3000
Fixed assets and 
working capital
6 months to 2 years
Subsidized
1 to 2 months
1
250 with education 
150 with credit
150
450
Impossible
Program is 
responsible
Little incentive 
because of subsidized 
interest rates and 
long payback periods
Create and strengthen 
employment; increase 
incomes
Smaller
Credit
US $100 initially and 
increasing to $1000
Working capital
2 weeks to 4 months 
Commercial or higher
4 to 7 days
4 to 6
400 with education 
600 with credit
2000
900
Possible, 1 to 2 years
Clients are 
responsible
Positive incentive 
because of high 
interest rates and 
short payback periods
*Unpublished table prepared by Stephen H. Gross (adapted and trans­
lated from Spanish).
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may be difficult to adapt the nontraditional approach to their needs. 
Meeting their needs probably requires some combination of the non­
traditional approach with the lending procedures of commercial banks. It 
may also require more of an emphasis on education, meaning that financial 
self-sufficiency is more difficult to attain.
The microenterprise component of PRODEM is a promising approach 
for small level II businesses and may be adaptable to even larger 
enterprises. Enterprises must participate in courses before their third 
loan. Instead of a solidarity group, participants need a "firma 
solidaria1' or a co-signer whom program staff visit before considering a 
loan. The loans are still so small, averaging US$193, that they probably 
do not meet the needs of larger entrepreneurs. Though the results of the 
first eight months are impressive, they are not nearly as impressive as 
those of the solidarity groups in the same program. In the first eight 
months 489 microentrepreneurs received loans, the repayment rate was 91 
percent, and the component was 59 percent self-sufficient. The same 
figures for the solidarity groups were approximately 293 groups (of three 
to eight entrepreneurs each) assisted, a 99 percent repayment rate, and 
88 percent self-sufficiency.
The problem is that while an inexpensive methodology has been 
developed to assist the poorest of entrepreneurs, one has not been fully 
developed to assist the better-off entrepreneurs of the informal sec­
tor. Therefore, it is necessary to continue implementing relatively 
costly programs geared towards levels II and III in order to provide 
the needed credit and assistance services and to develop a more effective 
methodology. All three levels of entrepreneurs need assistance.
Another limitation of the traditional and nontraditional ap­
proaches is that they tend to avoid addressing directly the constraints 
beyond credit and education that are of a more structural nature. More­
over, there may be areas where neither the traditional nor the non­
traditional approach can produce significant increases in employment 
and incomes for large numbers. It is doubtful that a program like PRODEM 
or BKK could be effectively implemented in the poor rural areas of 
Burkina Faso where APP is promoting microenterprises. While lack of 
credit and business education are major constraints on the entrepreneurs, 
the extreme underdevelopment of the economy, the low level of population 
density, and the lack of entrepreneurial tradition make enterprise 
promotion extremely difficult.
The Systems Approach
After about seven years of experience in rural areas of Burkina 
Faso, APP has found it necessary to implement a systems approach because 
addressing simply the credit and educational constraints was not 
particularly effective (46):
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(APP)*.. takes a systems approach to human and economic 
development. On the level of the individual, it couples 
access to an important means of production (credit), with 
knowledge of how to use this means, and with increased 
motivation and moral support for people developing enter­
prise activity. On the level of the area economy, this 
systems approach means assisting the entire range of 
productive activity necessary for an economy to grow: pro­
ducers, processors, repair services, retailers, whole­
salers, distributors, artisan manufacturers, and 
transporters. Clients are encouraged to analyze the needs 
and opportunities in the local economy and to propose 
enterprises that will fill them. Although APP prefers to 
respond to local demand, sometimes it takes a more 
initiating stance when there is a need for a certain kind 
of business (e.g. transport) to enable many producers to 
develop. APP is also careful not to encourage excessive 
production or competition for local markets.
The process has developed a relatively strong institution that can 
meet the needs of aspiring and experienced local entrepreneurs. More than 
half of the assisted entrepreneurs (from permanent enterprises operating 
for at least three years) felt that their businesses had improved during 
one year of assistance in terms of: net worth, use and maintenance of 
business records, quality and quantity of labor, refinement of product or 
service, management of cash, acquisition of inputs, reinvestment of 
profits, and the ability to obtain and use credit. More importantly, the 
program is providing much-needed links between the beneficiaries and 
formal businesses through contractual arrangements and apprenticeships. 
APP's support of the informal microentrepreneurs reduces the risk of 
exploitation in these arrangements. In addition, APP identifies and 
encourages activities In areas that can stimulate the economy, create 
more employment opportunities, and not lead to displacement.
The Port Sudan program is also actively encouraging closer working 
relationships between beneficiaries and more established or formal 
businesses and institutions. The program has management advisory teams 
that help arrange contracts for clients with formal sector firms and with 
relief agencies operating in the famine-stricken areas of Eastern 
Sudan. They arrange for the clients to hire local businessmen as teachers 
of business courses. The program addresses marketing problems by con­
structing markets in which clients can rent stalls to sell their 
wares. The income from these rentals and the fees charged for all of the 
services provided are expected to cover a significant portion of the 
program’s costs.
It is more difficult for programs like APP and Port Sudan to reach 
large numbers and be financially self-sufficient because of the indi­
vidual attention given to each entrepreneur. From 1981-1984 APP had 
disbursed 967 loans. In Port Sudan, the program is expected to serve 
up to 800 clients by the end of the second year. However, because the 
programs help create links between clients and formal firms, they may
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be contributing to profound changes in the structure of the local 
economies. They may be helping to integrate the economy so that poor 
entrepreneurs can respond to economic opportunities as easily as formal 
firms. The programs' abilities to make such long-term changes depends 
upon their institutionalization which, in part, depends upon their 
financial self-sufficiency. Both programs charge clients for all of the 
services provided. Once institutionalized, these programs should be able 
to provide microentrepreneurs with the same services that are available 
to formal firms. The logic behind this approach is explained by the 
coordinator of the Port Sudan program (6,5):
If big business can't survive without services 
(like continuous access to credit, consultancy, lobbying, 
public incentives such as serviced estates, etc.) how can 
one expect small business to survive without such ser­
vices....An agency serving small business must ultimately 
become self-financing as a temporary engagement is not 
sufficient and to expect subsidies in eternity is not 
realistic; don't offer help, but services; promote your 
services; economize; if returns on single cases are small 
go for big numbers; work quickly towards cost-recovery....
Though inevitably more costly, programs using a systems approach still 
need to strive for financial self-sufficiency in order to be insti­
tutionalized and provide a long-term service to microentrepreneurs. Such 
an approach may be the best way, in some situations, to improve the 
conditions of microentrepreneurs, create jobs for the poor, and alter 
existing local economic structures.
Contributions to Development
Obviously, there is much more to development than the provision of 
credit and services. A program that has a truly positive developmental 
impact is one that promotes equity and empowerment, two conditions 
without which the poor will never get beyond needing to be beneficiaries 
of development projects. Equity in this context means providing the poor 
with the same opportunities and services as the rest of the population so 
that they can partake in the benefits of development. Empowerment refers 
to enabling the poor to voice their concerns and have a say In the 
formation of the policies and decisions that affect them. It is usually 
the result of extensive community-level organizing. Well-designed and 
well-implemented microenterprise programs can contribute to both equity 
and empowerment.
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Promoting Empowerment
Programs that depend on the active participation of clients and 
encourage or facilitate organising among the poor have the most potential 
for contributing to empowerment (see 74). The solidarity group credit 
component is an excellent example. Required meetings within and among the 
groups encourage interaction among the microentrepreneurs. Participants 
have the opportunity and a forum in which to voice their grievances, 
discuss their problems, and propose solutions. These problems may be with 
the credit program itself, but, as the program becomes more routine, will 
tend to concern other aspects of the participants' lives.
In the FDD program, the meetings of the solidarity groups led to 
the formation of the Dominican Association of Tricicleros (vendors who 
sell primarily fruits and vegetables from tricycles throughout Santo 
Domingo). The Association helps participants to develop leadership skills 
such as public speaking, organizing, and financial management while 
providing a forum in which local issues can be discussed. In addition, 
the Association has created its own emergency loan fund, burial insurance 
fund, and savings cooperative. It is also instrumental in keeping the 
program administrators in touch with the concerns and views of the 
program participants.
The GBL, with its groups, centers, and clusters of centers has 
also provided an organizational structure which the landless can use to 
identify their problems and work together to solve them. The structure is 
intended to bring disadvantaged people "within the folds of some organi­
sational format which they can understand and operate, and can find 
socio-political and economic strength in it through mutual support" (35. 
p. 15). As a result, some schools are being established where the village 
meetings take place. Because over half of the bank’s staff and members 
are women, there is evidence of increased respect, rights, and leadership 
opportunities for women and a growing movement toward dowry-less 
marriages (37).
Perhaps the best example of credit as an organizational tool is 
the Working Women's Forum (WWF: Table 4, Row o) in Madras, India. Through 
attempts to organize poor urban women around social issues, organizers 
realized that the women’s main concern was getting money to maintain and 
expand their businesses. "The Forum sees credit as a catalyst that 
encourages women to organize" (13, p . 349). According to one report on 
WWF, the Forum (15 p. 1):
has provided its members with access to funds, has 
expanded to include support services such as child care, 
education, health and family planning and ...(has provided 
a) sense of strength and purpose... to tackle the political 
and social problems that affect their 1ives.
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Forming community-wide organizations through group credit programs 
helps the poor to be well-represented in these organizations. Smaller 
solidarity groups are less likely to suffer from the intra-community 
divisions that make it difficult for lower economic levels and selected 
castes, religions, or political affiliations to participate in 
community-wide organizations (72, p. 119). However, there is still no
guarantee that some people will not be self-selected out of participation 
or some solidarity groups be under-represented when participants form 
associations or larger groups.
In addition, empowerment requires more than organization. It can 
take place only when the poor control the resources and run the programs 
themselves. Therefore, the financial self-sufficiency and client involve­
ment of these programs is crucial. Although it is not fair for the poor 
to pay higher interest rates than the wealthy, it loosens the ties of 
dependency that many development programs tend to tighten. Increasing 
participation by clients in these programs also promotes independence. 
Programs that rely on a group credit component depend on the clients 
themselves for promotion, selection, and the repayment of loans for the 
entire group. This level of client involvement may be a crucial factor 
in program success and community organization (32, pp. 48-49):
Programs must be carried out through structures which 
themselves have their bases in local organizations, 
incorporating, representing, and directed by the intended 
beneficiaries....The presence of these program elements 
(active participation and shared responsibility on the 
part of the beneficiaries) thus appears to be the key to 
the establishment of a viable, long-term comprehensive 
lending program, as well as to the generation of other 
spin-off development endeavors undertaken by the marginal 
groups themselves.
Likewise, a credit program can be a spin-off endeavor for local 
organizations already involved in other community development 
activities. Because the poor have so little access to credit, a credit 
component within a community development organization is an effective 
mechanism for getting people involved in that organization. The Self 
Employed Women’s Association began as a workers' association concerned 
with low wages, poor working conditions, police harrassment, and 
exploitation by middlemen. The involvement of poor women in SEWA's 
activities was greatly increased when the Association opened its own bank 
and began to provide loans. Similarly, PRIDECO is primarily an urban 
development organization that, with the help of FEDECCREDITO, has 
effectively implemented a credit component. The incorporation of lending 
services into community development organizations can be an effective 
means of increasing interest and participation in those organizations.
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Promoting Equity
Without a credit service, poor entrepreneurs are unlikely to
escape their poverty. A system in which the wealthy can get loans and 
other business services while the poor cannot perpetuates the disparity 
between the two classes. Providing credit to the poor helps promote 
equity. Microenterprise programs, especially those stressing education, 
often are designed as programs of assistance to help informal sector 
entrepreneurs "graduate” to commercial banks and the formal sector. They 
are seen as a stepping stone for microentrepreneurs. Self-sufficiency 
is not important because the programs offer assistance to the poor that 
should not be needed one day. Instead, microenterprise programs should 
promote their assistance with the idea that they are institutionalizing a 
service to the poor that is continually available to the wealthy. The 
Managing Director of the GBL explains the lack of logic in the first 
approach (78, p. 15).
An odd question is usually raised by some: when would the 
poor be self-reliant so that the bank can stop giving them 
credit?
This is a very strange question. This is strange 
because nobody in his right mind will ever ask the ques­
tion: when would the rich (or the farmers) be self-reliant 
so that the banks can stop giving them credit?
To the extent that equity is of any concern, poor entrepreneurs 
should have access to the same services that wealthier entrepreneurs 
do. Programs like the GBL and BKK give large numbers of entrepreneurs 
access to credit while APP and the Port Sudan programs supply credit and 
services. Both approaches contribute to more equitable development to the 
extent that they can be institutionalized. This analysis has shown that 
entrepreneurs are credit-worthy, even without physical collateral, if 
lending procedures are adapted to their needs and not the needs of the 
wealthy. That such lending programs "can lend on the basis of personal 
judgements about the reliability of a person helps to overcome one of the 
major causes of inequality in the distribution of credit channeled 
through public and private banks" ( 7 2 . p . 115) .
Not Resolving All Concerns
Microenterprise promotion is not the sole answer to underdevelop­
ment . The needs of developing countries go far beyond the provision of 
credit and services to entrepreneurs in the informal sector. Microenter­
prise promotion is only one strategy, seemingly quite effective, for 
addressing low incomes and underemployment in the informal sector. How­
ever, it raises a variety of troubling issues. Firstly, the approach is 
different from the type of activities that development organizations are 
accustomed to supporting. They may find it difficult to justify aid to
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individually run profit-seeking businesses and call it development
assistance. On the other hand, is not aid to small farmers comparable? 
Though not producing food, many small enterprises sell food or provide 
goods and services that are basic needs.
Secondly, whether or not assisted businesses simply displace other 
struggling entrepreneurs has yet to be determined. It is likely that some 
displacement takes place but the complex relationships within the 
informal sector are not yet well enough understood to determine how 
much. Thirdly, evaluations of these programs may not be providing 
sufficient information to assess accurately the programs' develop­
mental worth. The immediate and long-term impact of the programs on 
families, communities, and employer-employee relations often is not 
addressed thoroughly. Moreover, the lack of control groups makes sta­
tistics of jobs created and increases in income a bit ambiguous. Evalu­
ations rarely consider the socio-economic environment of the program, 
leading to glowing reports of programs operating in relatively positive 
environments and severe criticisms of those operating in less promising 
areas (see 45).
Lastly, and most importantly, one must ask whether microenterprise 
promotion is conducive to bringing about long-term socio-economic 
development. As this analysis has shown, some programs can contribute to 
equity and empowerment. In the long run, however, it is possible that 
microenterprise promotion perpetuates the system against which it is 
struggling. Do programs simply benefit a small segment of the informal 
sector and leave the unassisted poor in poverty with even less oppor­
tunity for advancement? Will microenterprise promotion discourage 
the long-term structural changes that are needed to eliminate the gross 
poverty and inequality existing in developing countries?
The Case for Microenterprise Promotion
The concerns raised above are complex and some are unresolvable, 
just as they are when considered with regard to other types of develop­
ment initiatives. Even with these issues in mind, however, microenter­
prise promotion compares well to other types of development assistance. 
Most importantly, it directly addresses an obvious need. Incomes in 
the informal sector are low and levels of underemployment among the poor 
are high. There is no indication that the formal sector is going to be 
able to employ larger proportions of the population or decrease the 
dependency of the poor on the informal sector. It is much more likely 
that increasing percentages of the labor force in rural and urban areas 
will have to support themselves and their families through informal 
economic activities. These activities must generate enough jobs and 
incomes to keep people out of poverty. Informal firms need assistance if 
they are to be able to sustain even a portion of the growing labor force.
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Microenterprise programs can help create many jobs and increase 
the incomes of large numbers of very poor people. They can become 
institutionalized as financially self-sufficient programs run by local 
people. They can help convince governments and banks of the viability and 
credit-worthiness of informal enterprises. More favorable government 
policies will decrease the harrassment and discrimination against 
informal firms and increase their access to credit, services, inputs, 
markets„ and large contracts. Moreover, microenterprise promotion 
contributes to more equitable development by providing the poor with the 
credit and services which the rich use to build profitable businesses.
The nontraditional approach is an effective strategy for sup­
porting informal microenterprises. It makes the clients themselves 
responsible for determining credit-worthiness through credit groups or 
assessment by reputation. It reaches the poorest of entrepreneurs with 
very small loans that increase with prompt repayment. The programs 
approach financial self-sufficiency by charging unsubsidized interest 
rates and keeping costs low. They offer education and additional services 
only to those clients who recognize their need for such services and who 
are willing to pay for them. They encourage organization among the 
clients through group activities, meetings, or courses. Such organi­
zation increases the participation of the poor in decisions that affect 
their lives.
Where nontraditional credit programs may not be sufficient, the 
systems approach may be effective. It provides credit but also tries to 
establish beneficial links between poor clients and formal sector 
businesses and opportunities. It reaches fewer entrepreneurs but may be 
able to alter local economic structures, making them more favorable to 
informal firms.
Microenterprise programs that stress education or fail to strive 
for financial self-sufficiency appear ineffective from this comparison of 
programs. They are expensive, reach relatively few clients, and do not 
seem to create more jobs or raise incomes any more than programs that 
emphasize credit. Furthermore, because of their high costs, they are less 
likely to become institutionalized or influence government or bank 
policies.
Conditions in the informal sector are harsh. Government policies, 
development strategies, and population growth are not giving the poor any 
alternative to informal economic activities. The informal sector is 
growing and providing increasing percentages of people with incomes, 
goods, and services. At the same time, underemployment among the poor 
persists and incomes remain low. Microenterprise promotion is one 
strategy than can help improve this situtation. It is a strategy that can 
be implemented effectively In numerous situations to directly benefit 
many members of the informal sector. Moreover, microenterprise programs 
encourage the organization of the poor around social, political, and
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economic issues and consequently contribute to & more participatory and 
equitable system than that which currently exists.
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NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF FIFTEEN MICROENTERPRISE PROMOTION PROGRAMS
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Setting: Central Java, Indonesia. The program operates in relatively 
densely populated rural areas. Indonesia's economy was expanding 
moderately during the evaluation period.
Description: The program was launched in 1972. Its objective is to supply 
capital conveniently to the rural poor for off-farm income-generating 
activities. Local BKK units receive loans from the supervising bank 
and then make sub-loans, most of which are approved at the local 
level. Loan eligibility to sub-borrowers is determined by character 
reference from village headmen. Repeat loans function as an incentive 
for repayment and borrowers must begin with very small loans that 
increase as the repayment record warrants.
Implementing Organizations: The Central Java Provincial Development 
Bank received a loan from the Provincial Government to make loans to 
BKK branches. The Government helps supervise the program and subsidizes 
it by paying the salaries of one-third of BKK staff.
Results: Survey results show that loans have promoted the expansion of 
most borrowers3 businesses; one-quarter of clients have begun new 
economic activities; most reinvest profits into the business and 
withdraw from their forced savings accounts for consumption. The 
program has had a moderate effect on employment while considerably 
decreasing under-employment. It has contributed to village and area 
development, particularly through backward linkages.
(a) BKK PROGRAM
Full Name: Badan Kredit Kecamatan Program.
Source: (27).
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(b) GBL PROGRAM
Setting; Rural areas of Bangladesh.
Description: GBL sets up a bank unit with a field manager and a number of 
bank workers. For a loan, clients must form themselves into groups of 
five, select a chairman and secretary, and hold weekly meetings. A new 
group is observed for a month before two members are selected for 
taking loans. If these two members meet loan paybacks during the first 
month or two, the other group members become eligible for loans. If one 
member defaults, the whole group becomes ineligible to get repeat 
loans. Group members must contribute to a group savings fund and an 
emergency fund. Bank workers attend the weekly meetings, disburse 
loans, and collect payments.
ImplementinE_Organizations: The program used to be implemented in
cooperation with commercial banks but GBL is now an independent bank.
It is funded with investments by the Government, commercial banks, 
and members; loans from IFAD and the Bank of Bangladesh; and members' 
savings (10% of total funding by 1985).
Results: The households of Grameen borrowers have experienced average per 
capita income increases of 35 percent in real terms in two and one half 
years. In terms of levels of employment, client households are general­
ly better-off than comparable non-member households. The organizational 
structure has lead to an increasing number of loans for joint enter­
prises (8 percent of all loans in 1984).
Full Name: Grameen Bank Ltd.
Sources: (20, 34, 35, 36, 37, 78, 79).
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Setting; San Salvador, El Salvador. The program operates in 37 of the 
poorest neighborhoods of San Salvador.
Description: P/F was initiated in 1977 when FEDECCREDITO began working 
with PRIDECO in order to set up a loan program for the poor. The credit 
system depends on solidarity groups. Business owners form groups of 
from five to ten members and select a group leader. The group goes to 
the PRIDECO office where each member fills out a basic information 
form. Within a week, they are visited by an agent from both organi­
zations . Group members give their payments to the group leader who is 
visited weekly by a FEDECCREDITO collection agent. Loan size and 
frequency of payments for each group are determined by staff. Once the 
first loan is repaid, subsequent loans are usually approved within a 
week.
Implementing Organizations: PRIDECO Is a government-funded urban
community development organization founded in 1973 to assist slum
dwellers. FEDECCREDITO coordinates the country’s rural credit agencies 
and directly administers credit within San Salvador. It receives 
funding from the Central Reserve Bank, the Inter-American Development 
Bank, and the World Bank.
Results: Clients have increased their own incomes and local levels of 
employment. Investments in housing, nutrition, clothing, and education 
have increased. Some credit groups have initiated community projects.
(c) P/F PROGRAM
Full Name: PRIDECO/FEDECCREDITO
Source; (21).
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(d) PRODEM
Setting: Quito, Ecuador.
Description: The program began in May 1984 with two components, one for
individuals and one for solidarity groups. Both provide very small 
initial loans for short periods of time. Prompt repayment leads to 
larger loans for longer periods. Clients in either program must 
maintain a savings account. The solidarity groups form themselves, 
select a leader, and attend an orientation. The leader collects the 
loan payments and the groups meet frequently to exchange ideas and 
information. The microenterprise component provides loans to individual 
business owners. A credit agent visits the business, fills out an 
application, and usually disburses the loan in six to eight days. The 
first loan is for only US$50 to $100 and must be repaid within fifteen 
days. The same day it is repaid, however, the client may receive a 
second loan for about US$200. Before receiving a third loan, clients 
must attend a basic accounting course.
Implementing Organizations: PRODEM is a program of the Ecuadorian 
Development Foundation. The program is assisted by ACCION Inter- 
national/AITEC and funded by various international organizations.
Results: In its first eight months, PRODEM has reached over 1,500 
beneficiaries. Staff have noticed higher levels of employment and 
improved business management. Many solidarity group members have 
increased their activities enough to employ family members.
Full Name: Program for the Development of Microenterprises.
Sources: (8, 28, 29, 30').
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Setting: Monterrey, Mexico. The program began in the city but has 
extended to include a few rural towns outside of Monterrey.
Description: ADMIC was formed in 1981 to create income and employment 
opportunities for the industrial and commercial enterprises of Monter­
rey's informal sector. Each microenterprise receives an initial evalu­
ation that includes financial analysis and planning for the business 
and an assessment of its managerial and technical training needs. Cli­
ents must complete courses before applying for a loan. If a loan is 
approved, ADMIC helps the client secure it from a local bank. Clients 
pay for the courses which are in accounting, taxation, and project 
analysis. Staff visit client businesses to offer informal assistance.
Implementing Organizations: ADMIC was established as a Mexican affili­
ate of ACCION International/AITEC. It administers credit with the 
assistance of a local bank and a loan fund from the Inter-American 
Development Bank. Operational costs are covered by private sector 
donations, revenue from program activities, and grants.
Results: Many of ADMIC's clients have experienced substantial increases 
in incomes and employment. From 1981 to 1984 the program is estimated 
to have helped generate over 1200 new jobs in the city's informal 
sector. Participants also formed the Mexican Association of Micro­
entrepreneurs which has helped clients cut costs and develop linkages 
with larger producers by forming buying and selling groups.
(e) ADMIC PROGRAM
Full Name: Dynamic Assistance to Microenterprises.
Source: (3.) .
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(f) SEWA
Setting: Ahmedabad, India. The city's economy is based on textiles.
Description: SEWA was established in 1972 by a group of poor self-
employed women. It has an economic wing, a rural wing, an emphasis on 
organizing workers against harrassment and discrimination, and a bank. 
The SEWA bank began by administering loans from nationalized banks to 
SEWA members. Because of a variety of problems, however, SEWA began 
disbursing loans from its own funds in 1976. Any SEWA member can apply 
for a loan by filling out an application at the Bank. The woman is 
visited by a field worker who also talks to friends and neighbors of 
the applicant. Within two weeks, if the loan is approved, the money is 
deposited in the woman's savings account.
Implementing Organizations: SEWA is a grass-roots organization that 
grew out of the Women's Wing of the Textile Labor Association, one of 
the oldest and largest unions of textile workers in India. It has 
received support from many international organizations.
Results; SEWA's wide variety of activities, backed by the substantial 
research and sensitivity to women's problems of the SEWA staff, have 
led to many accomplishments. In terms of microenterprise promotion,
SEWA has provided credit, helped organize women into productive units 
to purchase raw materials and sell their goods collectively, linked 
women directly to suppliers and markets, provided training, and lobbied 
for public policies to support self-employed women.
Full Name: Self-Employed Women's Association.
Source: (66).
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Setting: Rural areas, Peru, By 1980 the program was operating in 19 of 
. Peru's departments, including most of the sierra and high jungle 
regions. During the time period evaluated (1975-1981), Peru's economy 
was beset by recession and extremely high rates of inflation.
Description: The Fund is managed by sixteen branch offices of the 
Industrial Bank of Peru (BIP), Over 80 percent of all loans can be 
approved locally. In order to be eligible, borrowers must have no 
alternative source of credit; belong to the artisan, small-scale 
industry, services, or small-scale agribusiness sectors; provide 
collateral for the full amount of the loan; and contribute at least 10 
percent of the amount to be invested. Loan applications usually take 
from two to three months to process. Depending upon the proposed use 
of the funds, loans may be paid directly to the supplier of the 
machinery or raw materials to be purchased. From 1978-1981, 60 percent 
of loans were smaller than US$584 and 10 percent greater than $12,400.
Implementing Organizations: The Government of Peru and US AID funded 
the Industrial Bank of Peru to implement the FDR program.
Results: Survey results show an average yearly increase of 53.5 percent 
in net income of loan recipients. Evaluators estimate that every $7000 
of loan funds helped create one additional full-time job. Though BIP 
plannned to continue capitalizing the fund, it had been fully decapi­
talized by 1981 because of the highly negative interest rates.
(g) FDR PROGRAM
Full Name: Rural Development Fund.
Sources (24).
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Setting: Recife, Brazil. UNO began as an urban program in 1972 but 
expanded and extended to Brazil's northeast interior. During the 
evaluation period (1973-1981), Brazil was suffering from extremely 
high rates of inflation.
Description: From 1974-1978 UNO was a modest lending program in Recife, 
making an average of 165 loans a year. In 1979 UNO became part of a 
World Bank project which resulted in a quadrupling of total UNO loans 
between 1979-1981. UNO generally carries out a census of an area's 
enterprises and then holds a promotional meeting to explain its 
program. By 1981, the selection process consisted of one visit to a 
censused firm to diagnose the firm and fill out a credit proposal. Wor­
king capital loans are generally for fifteen months and fixed asset 
loans for two years. The 25 percent interest rates are actually 
negative given Brazil's inflation rate (30-100 percent from 1974-80).
Implementing Organizations: UNO was created in 1973 by ACCION Inter-
national/AITEC. Most of its recent support has come from the World Bank 
and the Brazilian public sector.
Results: Most borrowers appeared to experience an increase in profits and 
standards of living, but little change in growth or productivity.
Though UNO reports the creation of 1.6 jobs per loan, Tendler's study 
(73) disputes this claim and argues that many of the assisted firms 
prefer not to expand.
(h) UNO PROGRAM
Full Name: Northeast Union of Assistance to Small Organizations.
Sources: (10. 73)
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(i) MIDP
Setting: Manila, Philippines.
Description: The program focuses on family-based microenterprises and 
identifies clients through interviews with community leaders and 
neighbors. Entrepreneurs are screened for their dependability, pro­
duction skills, attitudes, willingness to take a risk, and interest in 
expanding their business. MIDP staff work with the client to prepare a 
project feasibility study which is designed to help clients analyze the 
management, marketing, and financial aspects of the enterprise. Be­
fore receiving a loan, clients must attend a two day training course in 
basic business management and accounting. Staff give advice on all 
aspects of the business and help clients set up a bookkeeping system. 
Clients are visited weekly for two months after the loan is disbursed 
and monthly thereafter.
Implementing Organizations: MIDP is a branch of the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry. Some loan funds come through commercial banks.
Results: There appeared to be little evidence of significant, measurable, 
and sustained business growth on the part of participating enter­
prises. Increases in profits typically showed up through increased 
expenditures on the family and higher levels of living. Many businesses 
increased their sales considerably during the life of the loan, but 
showed little evidence of being able to sustain those increases. Em­
ployment generation was not found to be substantial.
Full Name: Micro-Industries Development Program.
Source: (10).
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(j) SELP
Setting: Manila, Philippines. The program primarily assists entrepreneurs 
from the squatter settlements of Metro Manila.
Description: Community leaders, who are experienced clients of the
program, receive a trial loan fund which they use to make very small 
loans to local entrepreneurs who have favorable character references 
and an entrepreneurial motivation. The leaders give a one-day orienta­
tion to clients on the goals and objectives of the program. They are 
responsible for collecting loan payments and visiting the clients to 
monitor the loans. A client can receive no more than three loans from 
the trial fund. Clients who graduate from the trial fund in good 
standing, carry out a project feasibility study with the help of the 
community leader, and participate in a two-day course become eligible 
for larger loans (US$38-$63) from a Philippine bank. Clients can get 
two loans at this level. Those who graduate from this level attend more 
advanced courses and are eligible for loans of US$125 to US$375.
Implementing Organizations: Manila Community Services Inc. operates the 
program and was founded by a number of church groups. It relies on loan 
funds from the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank.
Results: The evaluation (.10) indicates that SELP has the same general 
impact on clients as MIDP. However, the reliance on community leaders 
has generated benefits for the leaders who can take advantage of many 
of MCSI's activities, such as courses and family outings.
Full Name: Self Employment Program,
Sources: (10, 13, 60)
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Setting: Eastern region, Burkina Faso. The rural areas where APP operates 
are semi-arid and among the poorest parts of Burkina. The economy is 
underdeveloped and there is little entrepreneurial tradition.
Description: The program began as an experimental project in 1977. Pro­
spective APP clients must show sincere character and intention. They 
must put up 20 percent of the equity for the proposed project. APP 
works closely with each client to formulate a loan package appropriate 
for each enterprise. Loan size, repayment size and periods, and length 
of loans are all flexible and determined by the client and APP 
staff. The program provides business extension services to clients, 
arranges contracts, and enrolls clients into a network of mututal tech­
nical assistance in which previous APP clients help new clients.
Implementing Organizations: APP is the Burkina affiliate of the US PVO 
Partnership for Productivity. AID has funded most of the project but 
APP is raising some funds through private businesses in Burkina.
Results: An external evaluation of Phase I (1978-1981) indicated that the 
program contributed to small increases in income but had a negligible 
impact on employment (25.). In Phase II however, the program has doubled 
the number of loans disbursed and institutionalized its operations. It 
has linked clients to suppliers, markets, and formal sector firms. Sur­
veys indicate that clients have improved their business operations and 
profits much more than non-participants.
(k) APP PROGRAM
Full Name: Association for Productivity/Burkina.
Sources: (25. 46. 47).
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(1) FDD
Full Nam®: Microenterprise Program, Dominican Development Foundation,
Setting: Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, The Dominican economy has 
been in a recession and experiencing high rates of inflation*
Description: FDD 'has a solidarity group component and a microenterprise 
component. Most (S3 percent) of the members of the solidarity groups 
are "tricicleros" .A' They receive loans for working capital and to buy 
the carts that they usually rent, The weekly loan payments are less 
than the rental fees. To get loans, they must form groups, select a 
president, attend an orientation, and attend neighborhood meetings. In 
the other program component, assistance is to individual enterprises 
and considerable effort goes into setting up a bookkeeping system and 
improving management capacity. Enterprises receive frequent staff 
visits for management assistance both before and after loan approval.
Implementing Organisations: The Dominican Development Foundation and 
ACCION Internetional/AITEC began the program with funding from AID, 
local Dominican sources, and international organizations.
Results: Because of inflation, it is estimated that the real income of 
the tricicleros is declining slower than it would be without the pro­
gram. The solidarity groups formed the Dominican Association of Trici­
cleros. The individual microenterpreneurs have shown considerable 
increases in incomes and employment.
Sources: (5., 1_, 61) ,
1/"Tricicleros" sell primarily fruits and vegetables throughout Santo 
Domingo from carts that they pedal.
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Setting: Port Sudan, Sudan. The program operates in five of the most 
deprived neighborhoods where there are relatively high concentrations 
of refugees.
Description: The program is implemented by five Management Advisory 
Teams, one in each neighborhood. They process applications for assis­
tance, provide management assistance, administer loans, and initiate 
and strengthen links with the formal sector. Staff also arrange courses 
taught by formal sector entrepreneurs, identify and monitor sources of 
supply, solicit bulk contracts, and organize sub-contracting arrange­
ments . Much of the sub-contracting is with relief agencies operating in 
the famine-stricken areas of Eastern Sudan. The program is currently 
building five Industry Consultancy and Development Centres. They will 
each house an administrative office, workshop space, a marketing area, 
technical development workshops, and a women's business area. Space in 
the centers will be rented out to the microentrepreneurs.
Implementing Organizations: The program was begun by a European PVO,
Euro Action-ACORD, and funded by a variety of organizations.
Results: Of the 312 businesses that have received loans, one-third were 
start-up enterprises that the program helped initiate. Average incomes 
of business owners has doubled since they began participating in the 
program. The total number of jobs provided by the businesses went up 
from 289 before assistance to 392 after one year.
Source: (65).
(m) PORT SUDAN PROGRAM
Full Name: Port Sudan Small Scale Enterprise Programme.
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<n) DESAP
.Setting: Urban areas, Colombia. The program began in Cali but has spread
to other cities, including Bogota, Medellin, and Bucaramanga.
Description: The participation of entrepreneurs in the program begins 
with a visit by a promoter to the business. The promoter explains the 
program and invites the entrepreneur to a motivational meeting. At the 
meeting, the program is further explained, the problems of small 
businesses are discussed, and one successful entrepreneur gives a 
testimony. In order to continue participating, the client must enroll 
in and pay for two basic courses: accounting and costs. During the 
courses, the client is visited by a consultant in order to integrate 
the class material into the operations of the business. After com­
pleting the courses, the client is eligible for a loan, although staff 
might recommend further course work before the loan is disbursed. 
Courses are offered in many business-related subjects.
Implementing Organizations: DESAP is a program of the Colombian Carvajal 
Foundation. It has been assisted by US PVOs and receives loan funds 
from a variety of domestic and international sources. Carvajal also 
works with many local Colombian organizations.
Results: As of September, 1983 about US$500,000 in loan funds had been 
disbursed. It was estimated that one job had been generated for every 
$1000 in credit. Many participants felt that they had benefitted 
considerably from the courses.
Full Name: Program for the Development of Small Businesses.
Sources: (22, 40, 64).
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(o) W F
Setting; Madras, India. Members come primarily from the slums of Madras.
Description: WWF was begun by a political organizer and social worker who 
realized the necessity of organizing poor women around economic 
issues. She helped organize a group of thirty women in one slum area 
and leveraged a loan (for US$33 each) from the Bank of India. The 
success of that group led to the formation of WWF. To receive a loan, 
individuals must form a group and select a leader who stands as 
guarantor of the loan. A bank official attends a meeting of the group 
and interviews potential borrowers. The clients pick up the loan at the 
bank and then make daily or weekly payments to the group leader. She 
must deposit the payments in the bank before a stipulated date each 
month. WWF has also developed a number of social service projects.
There are day-care centers, night classes, skills training courses, a 
health and family planning program, and organized lobbying against 
discrimination and harrassment.
Implementing Organizations; WWF is a grass-roots organization with some 
international sources of funds. Credit is disbursed through eight local 
branches of the Bank of India.
Results; The credit program has allowed many women to initiate new
economic activities or expand and diversify their previous activities. 
Earnings in participating enterprises have increased an average of 50 
percent.
Full Name: Working Women's Forum.
Sources^ <13, II).
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